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"THE OPINION OF THE COURT"
By JUDGE MORTIMER STONE
Mortimer Stone received his A.B.
degree from Colgate University in
1904 and his LL.B. degree in 1910
from New York Law School. In
1953 he was awarded the D.C.L.
degree honoris causa by Colgate
University. From 1945 to 1953
Judge Stone sat as Associate Jus-
tice, and from 1953 to 1957 as
Chief Justice, of the Colorado Su-
preme Court. He is with the Denver
firm of Yegge, Bates, Hall and
Shulenberg, of counsel. A past pres-
ident of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion, Judge Stone is now a member
of the American, Colorado, and
Denver Bar Associations.
For many years in the official publication of the decisions and
opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court, it has been the set formula
to have the initial opinion prefaced by the statement: "Mr. Justice
Doe delivered the opinion of the court." The opinion following that
preface, in most cases, has been concurred in by the requisite num-
ber of judges so as to become in fact the opinion as well as the
judgment of the court; but such is not always the case. When the
preface is not true the hurried attorney and sometimes the court
itself is likely to be deceived.
The UnIted States Supreme Court carefully distinguished be-
tween the fipquently-used terms "opinion" and "decision" in Rogers
v. Hill.1 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Butler, said:
"Here the mandate was to proceed not in accordance
with the 'opinion' but with the 'decision'. These words,
while often loosely used interchangeably, are not equiva-
lents. The court's decision of a case is its judgment thereon.
Its opinion is a statement of the reasons on which the judg-
ment rests."
As said by the Missouri Supreme Court: "[U] ntil the opinion is
adopted by the court it is not its product. When it is so adopted it
becomes the decision of the court."
2
In other words, there may be a decision of the court as to the
judgment to be rendered without decision as to the reasons therefor.
A classic example of that situation is the case of Yunker v.
Nichols,3 where the three judges agreed that the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed but each in a separate opinion based
1 289 U.S. 582, 587 (1933).
2 Edwards v. Bell, 343 Mo. 824, 123 S.W.2d 83, 85 (1938).
3 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
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his conclusion on a different ground.
Where a majority of the court concurs merely in the result, the
principles expressed in an opinion cannot be considered as control-
ling under the rule of stare decisis. Where two or more judges de-
liver opinions which arrive at the same result, but for different
reasons, and other judges concur generally, the case cannot be con-
sidered as authority on any of the reasons urged.4 For example, the
court in Scott v. Times-Mirror Co.5 said:
[O]nly four Justices participated in the decision, and
only three of these concurred on this point .... Since the
concurrence of four members of the court is necessary to
a decision in bank. . , it is plain that the language quoted
... is not a decision of this court upon the point there con-
sidered."
Conversely, as our Colorado Court has held, where a majority
of the court approves a rule stated in a concurring opinion, it be-
comes the opinion of the court.6 Where the court divides equally,
and judgment is affirmed by operation of law, it constitutes no
precedent. 7 In a state which has asserted the controlling authority
of stare decisis,8 the status of an opinion becomes a matter of im-
portance; and it is still a point to be argued even if we have some-
times changed to the "Rule of the Chancellor's Foot."
In the Colorado Reports up to Volume 12, there is no statement
as to the opinion of the court, and only the name of the judge who
wrote the opinion is used. In these early volumes, however, care
was taken to state when the opinion was not that of the court. In
reporting the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eyser,10 the opinion
by Mr. Justice Belford was followed by a statement by Mr. Justice
Wells of the questions on which the opinion of Mr. Justice Belford
was not concurred in by the other judges, and it was also said that:
"Upon the other questions the opinion of Mr. Justice Belford is the
opinion of the whole court."'"
Even after the use of the "Opinion of the Court" prefix was
begun in Volume 12 of the Colorado Reports, it was not uniformly
followed for a time, and the court was still careful in their use of
the word "opinion." In reporting Raynolds v. Ray,12 it was stated
before the first opinion that: "Mr. Justice Elliott delivered the
opinion of the court concerning the validity of the attachment
liens." Then, following his opinion, it was said: "Chief Justice Beck
(dissenting upon the validity of the attachment liens) delivered
the opinion of the court on other points." Such meticulous care, how-
ever, has long been disregarded.
4 See 21 C.J.S. 305-06 (1940) and cases cited therein.
5 181 Cal. 345, 184 Pac. 672, 679 (1919).
6 London Guaranty Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
7 People ey t, Walker v. Stapleton, 79 Colo. 629, 247 Pac. 1062 (1926).
8 Newton v. Mann, 111 Colo. 76, 137 P.2d 776 (1943); Murray v. Newmeyer, 66 Colo. 459, 182
Pac. 888 (1919).
9 "1 can not agree that the doctrines of this court are to be changed with every succeeding judge.
Nothing would inflict on me greater pain in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done
anything to justify the reproach that the equity of this court varies like the Chancellor's foot." Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 414, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch, 1818) (Lord Eldon, L.C.)
10 2 Colo. 141 (1873).
11 Id. at 169.
12 12 Colo. 108, 113, 116, 20 Pac. 4 (1888).
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In so designating the opinions, our Colorado Court has followed
the wording adopted by the United States Supreme Court, but that
Court seems carefully to restrict the designation to those opinions
which are majority opinions. As illustrations, in Northwest Air-
lines v. Minnesota,13 where four of the nine justices joined in dis-
sent and another concurred in the conclusion, it is reported that:
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the conclusion and judgment
of the Court." A similar announcement was made in Hartzell v.
United States. 14 In Screws v. United States,15 it was reported that:
"Mr. Justice Douglas announced the judgment of the court and
delivered the following opinion in which the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Reed concur."
Our Colorado constitution provides that the Supreme Court
may sit en banc or in two or more departments. No decisions of any
department shall become the judgment of the court unless con-
curred in by at least three judges. 10
A majority of the members constitute the court en banc and
a majority as thus constituted may decide a case, if at least three
judges concur.
17
No attempt is made here to furnish a complete list of the "Opin-
ions of the Court" which are plainly minority opinions, or those
which are without three concurring judges; nor to analyze the
opinions specially concurring as to the points of concurrence with
the "majority" opinion. We have checked through only a few
volumes of the reports for illustrations of the caution needed in
search for precedents in prior reported opinions. This check, through
Volumes 104 through 137 of the Colorado Reports, reveals at least
twenty cases in which the "Opinion of the Court" appears in whole
or part not to be a majority opinion.18
The case which seems best to point the moral and adorn the
tale is Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.19 The opinion by
Mr. Justice White was adopted with three judges dissenting just
prior to the end of Mr. Justice White's term. Rehearing was later
granted, and almost six months after Mr. Justice White left the
court, his opinion was again brought up for adoption. Three of the
members of the court dissented. Mr. Justice Teller wrote an opin-
ion arriving at the same conclusion as previously reached but by
13322 U.S. 292 (1944).
14 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
15 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
16 Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5.
17 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. People ex rel. Wilson, 68 Colo. 487, 190 Pac. 513 (1920); Den-
ver & R.G.R.R. v. Burchord, 35 Colo. 539, 86 Pac. 749 (1906).
18 The following are the cases turned up by our limited search: Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc.,
336 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1959); Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. I11, 314 P.2d 698 (1957); Ace Flying
Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dept. of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957); Tate v. People, 125
Col.. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952); Enos v. District Court, 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861 (1951); Chesney v.
People, 121 Colo. 73, 212 P.2d 1011 (1949); Cover v. Denver, 120 Colo. 451, 211 P.2d 830 (1949); Page
v. Lane, 120 Colo. 416, 211 P.2d 549 (1949); Ochsner v. Langendorf, 115 Colo. 453, 175 P.2d 392
(1946); Kidder v. People, 115 Colo. 72, 169 P.2d 181 (1946); McCutchen v. Jordan, 112 Colo. 499, 150
P.2d 859 (1944); Industrial Comm'n v. Parra, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P.2d 405 (1943); Aleman v. Annable,
110 Colo. 61, 129 P.2d 987 (1942); People ex rel. Lucke v. County Court, 109 Colo. 447, 126 P.2d 334
(1942); Denver v. Midwest Plumbing & Heating Co., 109 Colo. 395, 125 P.2d 960 (1942); Nebraska
Bridge Supply & Lumber Co. v. Deakin, 109 Colo. 367, 125 P.2d 962 (1942); Cox v. Godec, 107 Colo.
69, 108 P.2d 876 (1940); Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 290, 104 P.2d 612 (1940); Hall v. Hall, 105
Colo. 227, 97 P.2d 415 (1939); North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567 (1939).
19 67 Colo. 225, 84 Pac. 604 (1919).
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a different line of argument. Mr. Justice Burke, by a separate opin-
ion, concurred in the conclusion reached in the "majority" opinion.
Mr. Justice Dennison by another separate opinion said that he con-
curred in "the conclusion of the majority of the court as announced
in the former opinion handed down in this case" and that "I am
authorized to state that Mr. Justice Allen concurs in this opinion."
This accounts for all seven judges of the court and not one of them
concurred entirely in the opinion of Mr. Justice White, the former
member. Yet the official report of the case states: "Mr. Justice
White delivered the opinion of the court."
As indicative of the extent to which the court itself may be-
come confused as a result of such indiscriminate labeling of opin-
ions, it is interesting to note that Kidder v. People20 was decided
with one judge not participating and three judges concurring in the
result "solely on the ground that defendant was not properly repre-
sented." The court being evenly divided as to other grounds stated
in the opinion, patently that was the only point decided. Yet, in
Warren v. People,-1 the court said: "One of the grounds for reversal
by this court of a judgment of conviction.., in the case of Kidder
v. People ... was that the one count upon which the jury returned
a verdict of guilty was insufficient." Again, in Cross v. People
22
the court said: "The statute here involved has been construed by
us in the following cases: . . . Kidder v. People. . . ." And again, in
Hardy v. People,2 3 the court said: "In our opinion in the Kidder
case ... we held that the question of the sufficiency of an informa-
tion to charge a crime could be raised in the supreme court for the
first time ... "
Enos v. District Court24 was decided with one judge dissenting
and three judges concurring only in the result. Yet, in Fiant v. Town
of Naturita,25 a quote from the minority opinion is cited as the
opinion of the court.
In Tate v. People26 a judgment of conviction was reversed. The
"Opinion of the Court" stated that one ground for the reversal was
20 115 Colo. 72, 169 P.2d 181 (1946).
21 121 Colo. 118, 121, 213 P.2d 381, 383 (1949).
22 122 Colo. 469, 471, 223 P.2d 202, 203 (1950).
23 133 Colo. 201, 206, 292 P.2d 973, 976 (1956).
24 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861 (1951).
25 127 Colo. 571, 574, 259 P.2d 278, 279 (1953).
26 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952).
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that prejudicial error had been committed by instructing on first
degree murder when not sustained by the evidence, even though
a verdict was returned of second degree. This holding specifically
overruled Ryan v. People.2 7 However, four judges joined in a me-
morandum opinion specifying the grounds on which in their opin-
ion the trial court committed error, which did not include the
ground of instruction on first degree murder. Yet, in Eckhardt v.
People,2 8 where a similar issue arose, the court, speaking through
the same judge who wrote the "Opinion of the Court" in the Tate
case, admitted that earlier cases had held to the contrary, but stated
that "this situation existing in this jurisdiction was clarified by the
latest pronouncement of this court on that question in the case of
Tate v. People . . ." and quoted from his opinion on that issue,
which had not been supported by the majority of the court, as
authority for overruling prior decisions of the court.
Even the case of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co., 29
discussed above, has frequently been cited by the court and has
been quoted from as the voice of the court in Berman v. Denver"
and Bennett v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co.31
The opinions in Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc.,32 where
two judges dissented and two others filed specially concurring opin-
ions, illustrate the difficulty shared even by members of the courit
in determining on what points, if any, the concurring opinions con-
cur in the so-called "majority" opinion, other than in the result.
The designation, in its instructions for publication, of the opin-
ions and iparts of opinions which are the expression of the opinion
of the court, would put a further burden on an already over-
burdened court, but we think it would assist both the bar and the
courts in their necessary research and perhaps make a challenge
for clarity of expression in concurring opinions.
2750 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
28 126 Colo. 18, 22, 247 P.2d 673, 675 (1952).
29 67 Colo. 225, 84 Pac. 604 (1919).
30 120 Colo. 218, 230, 209 P.2d 754, 760 (1949).
31 121 Colo. 325, 333, 215 P.2d 714, 717 (1950).
32 336 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1959).
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THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1933-SOME
RECURRING PROBLEMS FOUND IN REGULATION A
By RALPH H. ERICKSON
Ralph H. Erickson received his B.S.
degree in 1954 from Lawrence Col-
lege, and his L.L.B. degree from the
University of Michigan in 1957. He
was with the Denver Regional Of-
fice of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission from
1953 to 1957. Mr. Erickson is pres-
ently an associate in the Denver
firm of Roath and Hertz, and is a
member of the American, Colorado,
and Denver Bar Associations.
INTRODUCTION
Regulation A is the general exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the statu-
tory authorization of section 3 (b) of that act.' That subsection per-
mits the Commission to exempt, by rule and regulation, securities
that are part of an issue offered to the public for an aggregate
amount not in excess of $300,000.
To qualify for the regulation A exemption it is necessary to file
with the Commission a notification and copies of the offering circu-
lar (which must be used in making the offering), and certain other
exhibits. The notification must be prepared in accordance with Form
1-A and should contain information enabling the Commission to
determine whether or not the exemption is initially available. The
offering circular must include the information required by schedule
I of Form 1-A and such other information as is necessary for the
investor to make an informed investment decision.
The attorney and others connected with the regulation A offer-
ing should constantly bear in mind that it is not a "self-contained"
regulatory device, but merely a body of rules subordinate
to an extensive background of both statutory and case law. Basic-
ally, if the terms and conditions of regulation A are met, only an
exemption from the registration requirements set forth in section 5
1 48 Stat. 76, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958). SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-62 (Supp.
1959) in its present general form became effective an March 6, 1953, and was thereafter revised
on July 23, 1956. For an article discussing the exemption as it existed after the 1953 change from
the earlier much different version, see Krakover & Mehler, Some Asp
t
ects of the Securities Regulation
Law: Regulation 'A' and its Revision, 32 DICTA 71 (1955). For an article discussing regulation A in
its present revised form, see Hertz, Federal Securities Act of 1933: Revised Regulation A, 33 DICTA
307 (1956). For a general discussion of this exemption, see Loss, Securities Regulation 380 (1915),
and Loss, Securities Regulation 165 (Supp. 1955).
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of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended2 is available. The reader
is reminded that section 5 makes it unlawful to use any of the means
of interstate commerce to offer to sell or buy a security unless a
registration statement has been filed with the Commission, or to
sell or deliver a security after sale unless a registration statement
is in effect as to that security.
The purpose of this article is to discuss and analyze a few of
the problems that arise either in connection with the preparation
of the material to be filed under regulation A, or during the course
of the offering pursuant to the regulation. The following discussion
is presented with the observations on the limitations noted above
in mind, and with the ever-present thought that each case presents
different facts in different surroundings, thereby limiting the con-
clusiveness of any offered solutions.
I
If the issuer is in the promotional stage (basically, this is de-
termined by whether or not it has had a net income from opera-
tions), the special provisions of rule 253 apply.3 The most important
provisions are those contained in paragraph (c) of rule 53 which
sets forth the requirement that certain securities in addition to those
being directly offered to the public must be included in computing
the amount of securities being offered, unless "effective provision is
made, by escrow arrangement or otherwise, to assure that none of
such securities or any interest therein will be reoffered to the public
within one year after the commencement of the offering. ' '4 This is
significant in light of the statutory ceiling'of $300,000 on the amount
of any public offering under regulation A. The word "effective"
apparently contemplates an irrevocable agreement with an inde-
pendent person.
Specifically included in the computation of the amount being
offered are: (1) all securities issued to and held by "any director,
officer or promoter of the issuer, or . . . any underwriter, dealer
or security salesman," whether or not they were issued for services,
2 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
3 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.253(a) (Supp. 1959): "The following provisions of this section
shall apply to any offering under . . . (this regulation) of securities of any issuer which-
(1) was incorporated or organized within one year prior to the date of filing the notification
required by § 230.255 and has not had a net income from operations; or
(2) was incorporated or orqanized more than one year prior to such date and has not had a
net income from operations, of the character in which the issuer intends to engage, for at least
one of the last two fiscal years."
In summary those following provisions are: (b) requirements for certain issuers incorporated or
organized in Canada or those proposing to conduct their principal business operations in Canada,
(d) the provisions are unavailable to persons other than issuers, and (e) rule 257, which sets certain
minimal requirements for offerings not in excess of $50,000, shall not be available for any offer-
ing if the issuer is subject to this rule. Subsection (c) is discussed in text.
4 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.25
3
(c) (Supp. 1959): "In computing the amount of securities
which may be offered hereunder, there shall be included, in adition to the securities specified in
§ 230.254-
(1) all securities issued prior to the filing of the notification, or proposed to be issued, for a
consideration consisting in whole or in part of assets or services and held by the person to whom
issued; and
(2) all securities issued to and held by or proposed to be issued, pursuant to options or other-
wise, to any director, officer or promoter of the issuer, or to any underwriter, dealar or security
salesman;
Provided, that such securities need not be included to the extent that effective provision is
made, by escrow arrangements or otherwise, to assure that none of such securities or any interest
therein will be reoffered to the public within one year after the commencement of the olering
hereunder and that any reoffering of such securities will be made in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the act."
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property or cash, and (2) all securities issued to any person for prop-
erty or services, if presently held by the person to whom issued.
One problem may arise over the meaning of the words "issued to
and held by" or "presently held by the person to whom issued."
After a brief consideration of the provisions of the rule one might
mistakenly conclude that they could be easily circumvented. To
avoid including securities in the $300,000 amount allowed, it would
appear one could transfer the securities to a non-officer not reim-
bursed in securities for services or property, with the transferor
retaining control over the securities; or, alternatively, all stock for
either the officers or those persons who are to be reimbursed in
stock for services or property, might be "issued to" one party and
then have him transfer the securities to the planned holders. Ob-
viously, the rule was not meant to be illusory. The answer lies in
the reasonable interpretation of the language used. "Held by" would
comprehend control as well as record ownership of the securities by
the person subject to the rule. For instance, an officer could not
transfer record ownership to his wife and avoid the rule, at least
not absent a showing that the transfer was in good faith and that
the securities are no longer subject to his control. Also, an attorney
paid with securities for his services, could not transfer record title
to his law firm to avoid the rule. With regard to the "issued to"
wording it would seem that if the transferee from the issuer is a
mere conduit to the intended holders the securities would in fact
be "issued to" these intended holders. In other words, the escrow
provisions are included in the revised regulation to accomplish a
very practical protection for investors-to keep off the market
securities that were issued to insiders and others who often con-
tribute very little for them.
These so-called "escrow provisions" include securities "pro-
posed to be issued, pursuant to options or otherwise," as well as
securities issued when the filing is made. Of course, warrants or
some other form of right to acquire securities which are evidenced
by a certificate can easily be included in an escrow arrangement
as they can be physically transferred to the escrow agent. But what
course should be followed when the securities "proposed to be
issued" are found in an option arrangement set forth only in a
resolution of the issuing corporation's board of directors, or when
the option to purchase securities depends on the occurence of certain
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The easiest answer to this problem is to provide in the escrow
agreement that any securities issued in the one-year period pursuant
to option to any of the persons covered by the rule will be placed
directly into the hands of the escrow agent. For this purpose the
issuing corporation, as well as the escrow agent and any person
subject to the escrow provisions, should be made a party to the es-
crow agreement. These steps should be taken even though the option
might be nontransferable, nonassignable and nonexercisable for a
period of one year, for the reason that the option agreement may be
changed. This consideration may be especially critical if the optionee
controls the issuer. Since many options are also securities, they are
subject to the terms of the rule, and all options should, therefore, be
specifically included in the escrow agreement along with the con-
dition that the option holders are not to transfer the option within
one-year period. Similarly, it should be understood by all of the
parties that their interest in the escrow agreement itself may not be
assigned or transferred inasmuch as this would probably be con-
sidered a transfer of an interest in a security.
II
Often attorneys and their clients encounter problems involving
the term "underwriter" when preparing a regulation A offering.
Inasmuch as that term involves some of the most complex problems
that arise under the federal securities laws, a complete treatment
of the subject is beyond the scope of this article.5 However, the
following brief discussion regarding the term "underwriter," limited
to certain situations involving distributiots of new offerings, is
presented to point out some of the problems to be considered in
connection with the distribution of a regulation A offering.
Initially, the attorney should be aware that determination
of whether a person distributing the issuer's securities is an
"underwriter" as that term is defined in section 2 (11) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, as amended,6 is important for two reasons. First,
if the distributor is an "underwriter" the provisions of paragraphs
(d) and (e) of rule 252 of regulation A become significant.'
Generally, paragraph (d) indicates that the exemption under
regulation A is not available if any underwriter of the securities to
be offered has been convicted, within ten years prior to the filing,
of any crime of offense involving the purchase or sale of any
security, or arising out of such person's conduct as an underwriter,
broker-dealer, or investment adviser; is subject to any order
5 See generally Loss, Securities Regulation (1951, Supp. 1955).
648 Stat. 75 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1958), in relevant part reads as follows:
"The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to,
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates
or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a
person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of
the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. .... .
It would be well to note that prior to the 1956 revision, regulation A was primarily concerned
only with the "principal underwriter" of an offering and that term was defined in 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.215(c) (1933), as:
"an underwriter who is a party to the underwriting agreement (whether written or oral) with
the issuer or other person on whose behalf the securities are offered hereunder. 'Underwriter' shall
have the meaning given in Section 2(11) of the Act."
7 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252(d)-(e) (Supp. 1959).
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enjoining or restraining him from engaging in or continuing any
conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security or arising out of his conduct as an underwriter, broker-
dealer or investment adviser; is subject to an order of the Securities
and Exchange Commission entered pursuant to section 15 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (denial, revocation, or cancellation
of a broker-dealer registration); has been found by the Commission
to be a cause of any such order which is still in effect, or is subject
to an order of the Commission pursuant to section 203 (d) or (e) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; 9 is suspended or expelled from
membership in a national or provincial securities association, or a
national securities exchange or a Canadian securities exchange for
conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of the trade;
or is subject to a United States Post Office fraud order.
In general, paragraph (e) provides that the exemption shall not
be available for the securities of the issuer if any underwriter of
those securities was an underwriter or was named as an underwriter
of any securities covered by any registration statement which is
the subject of any proceeding or examination under section 8 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 10 or which is the subject of any
refusal order or stop order entered under that section of the act
within five years prior to the proposed filing; or was the under-
writer or was named as the underwriter of any securities covered
by any filing which is subject to pending proceedings under rule
261 of regulation A"l (provisions regarding suspension of the avail-
ability of the exemption provided by regulation A) or any similar
rule adopted under section 3 (b) of the Securities Act 1 2 or to an
order entered thereunder within five years prior to the filing.
When reviewing the above so-called "disabilities" denying the
use of the regulation, it would be well to note that a conviction
received more than ten years before the filing is in itself immaterial
in determining the availability of the regulation, but an injunction
or restraining order entered at any time prior to the filing makes
regulation A unavailable if the underwriter is still subject to
that order.
Secondly, regulation A calls for disclosure of the name and
address of each underwriter in the offering circular.' 3 Failure to
disclose one or more underwriters may be a material omission on
which could be based an order suspending the availability of the
exemption for the proposed offering.
If the distributor of the securities offered is a broker-dealer
who engages in the business of selling securities issued by others,
there is little doubt that its operations bring it clearly within the
definition of "underwriter" as contained in the Securities Act of
1933, as amended. On the other hand, if the president of the issuer
in his spare time sells the issuer's securities with all proceeds going
to the issuer he would probably not be an underwriter because in
8 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958).
9 54 Stat. 851, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(d)-(e) (1958).
1048 Stat. 79, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1958).
11 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.261 (Supp. 1959).
12 48 Stat. 76, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958).
13 SEC. Reg. A, Form I-A (Schedule I, paragraph 5), 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (Supp. 1959).
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the contemplation of the statutory definition it seems he would be
acting in his normal corporate capacity as the issuer's agent rather
than engaging in the distribution solely to directly benefit himself
as an individual. It should be noted that, ordinarily, an issuer would
not be considered an underwriter of its own securities.
14
Unfortunately, the facts are not always as clear as those in
these two illustrations. Consider a situation in which officers are to
distribute the issuer's securities at the same commission rate and
during the same period of time as securities dealers under contract.
The Securities and Exchange Commission in its decision in Ameri-
can Tung Grove Developments, Inc.15 held that officers under cer-
tain circumstances are underwriters. In substance, the reason given
for holding officers to be underwriters in that case were: it
appeared they were to spend a major portion of their time in making
the offering; and they were to be compensated at the same rate for
their sales as professional securities brokers and dealers. Thus, they
were acting as independent contractors rather than officers acting
on behalf of the company.
14 The only exception to this conclusion might be found in rule 140 of the General Rules and
Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 230.140 (1949). which reads
as follows:
"A person, the chief part of the business of which consists in the purchase of the securities of
any one issuer, its subsidiary and/or affiliate and in the sale of its own securities to furnish the
proceeds with which to acquire the securities of such issuer, subsidiary and/or affiliate, is to be
regarded as engaged in the distribution of the securities of such issuer, subsidiary and/or affiliate
within the meaning of section 2(1)."
15 8 S.E.C. 51 (1940).
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In an early decision the Commission held that salesmen spe-
cially engaged by the issuer to distribute an offering on a commis-
sion basis were underwriters.16 An interesting decision by the Com-
mission illustrating that each case must be considered on its own
facts is Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc.17 It appeared that one of the
promoters of the company was hired to prepare sales literature for
use in the distribution of the securities and to supervise the sale of
stock. He was also to render his best services in bringing about the
sale of the stock and was to be compensated for his services in stock
if the offering were successful. If the agreement had been fully
performed, the Commission indicated that the promoter would be
considered an underwriter. However, it was shown that he prepared
the sales materials which were used directly by the issuer without
referring to himself as the author of those materials. If he had
referred to himself as author, it would have suggested that he was
dealing in the securities as an underwriter. It was also shown that he
merely acted as an adviser to the issuer in the distribution of the
securities but did not personally offer to sell any of the securities.
As a result, the Commission held that he was not acting as an
underwriter since evidence was lacking that he actually supervised
the issuer's sales activities.
Although it appears that a person distributing the issuer's
securities is an underwriter, if he is paid a commission or similar
remuneration, it does not necessarily follow that if the total pro-
ceeds of the offering are received by the issuer, there is no under-
writer. For example, in the case of SEC v. Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Ass'n.-8 it was held that the association was an under-
writer within the definition given in the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, even though it appeared the association was not receiving
a commission or other tangible compensation for services rendered
in connection with a public distribution of unregistered Chinese
government bonds. Of importance is the fact that the association
was not related officially or contractually to the Chinese govern-
ment. The services consisted of stimulating public interest in the
bonds and in accepting orders and payments for them. Clearly the
association's activities were those of an underwriter, the only un-
usual factor being the lack of compensation flowing to it.
Thus, two prime considerations in determining whether a
person is an underwriter are: the presence or absence of a commis-
sion or other similar compensation, and the capacity in which the
person works-i.e., whether he acts as an agent of the issuer or as
an independent distributor of the securities. In any event, it seems
clear that the facts of each situation must be carefully studied in
the light of the meaning of "underwriter" as set forth in the
Securities Act. Any person, other than one receiving "a commission
from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and cus-
tomary distributor's or seller's commissions," may be an under-
writer if he offers or sells for an issuer, and this disclosure should
16 American Gyro Company, 1 S.E.C. 83 (1935).
17 10 S.E.C. 358 (1941).
18 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941).
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be made under regulation A.
Again, it should be pointed out that this brief treatment of some
of the problems connected with the term "underwriter" applies only
to new offerings by an issuer. No attempt has been made to discuss
some of the other problems arising in connection with that term in
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, such as the ramifications of
a sale of an issuer's securities owned by a person controlling that
issuer. The discussion here is intended solely to point out that there
are certain problems in deciding whether or not a person selected
to assist in distributing the offering is an underwriter, and whether
disclosure concerning arrangements of the offering must be made
in the material filed under regulation A.
III
Other problems arise in connection with the appropriate time
to commence the offering pursuant to regulation A, the manner of
making the offering, and restrictions on the content and use of sales
material supplementing the offering circular.
Regulation A provides for nothing comparable to the "red her-
ring" or preliminary prospectus used in connection with registered
offerings, as implicitly allowed under the terms of section 5 (b) of
the Securities Act, 19 and as expressly permitted by rule 433 there-
under.20 Under regulation A no offering may be made prior to the
expiration of. the ten-day waiting period imposed by rule 255 (a)21
unless the Commission authorizes the commencement of the offer-
ing prior to the expiration of that period. In other words, no use
can be made of any communication that could be deemed an "offer"
as that term is defined in section 2 (3) of the Securities Act,22 includ-
ing the solicitation of "indications of interest," unless and until the
waiting provisions of regulation A have been observed or waived
by Commission action.
Furthermore, counsel and the issuer should be satisfied prior
to the commencement of the offering that the exemption provided
by regulation A is available. The review by the staff of the regional
offices provides assistance in this regard but should not be relied
upon as being final or conclusive, since it is generally understood
that the burden of complying with the regulation and sustaining the
availability of the exemption rests upon the person claiming it.21
This burden is in no way lessened or shifted by the staff's advisory
review.
For some time the Securities and Exchange Commission has
been concerned with the problem of the use of press and other
19 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1958).
20 SEC Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (Supp. 1959) (prospectus for use prior to registration).
21 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. 1 230.255(o) (Supp. 1959):
"At least 10 days (Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excluded) prior to the date on which the
initial offering of any securities is to be made under this regulation, there shall 'be filed with the
Regional Office of the Commission specified below four copies of a notification on Form 1-A. The
Commission may, however, in its discretion, authorize the commencement of the offering prior to
the expiration of such 10-day period upon a written request for such authorization."
22 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1958):
"The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for sale', or 'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispc-e
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.
23 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Company, 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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public information releases by issuers and their underwriters prior
to or during a public distribution of securities.2 4 Basically, the ques-
tion is whether the publicity is in fact information not meeting the
statutory requirements 25 of a prospectus, in violation of section 5 (b)
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.26 The Commission on
October 8, 1957, in Securities Act Release No. 3844 discussed the
coverage of section 5 and presented illustrative cases which in its
opinion were or were not offers in violation of that section. Among
those illustrated was a situation involving a brokerage firm which
planned to underwrite a proposed offering. Prior to the filing with
the Commission the firm distributed to its clientele an informational
brochure describing in glowing terms the general industry repre-
sented in its proposed underwriting. Although no particular issuer
or security was discussed in the-brochure the circumstances clearly
indicated a first step in the public offering of securities and thus,
in the opinion of the Commission, an offering in violation of section
5 of the Securities Act. Another situation considered to be in viola-
tion of that section involved a promotional mining company which,
in conjunction with the proposed underwriter, issued a series of
press releases on the activities of the company, its estimated ore re-
serves and its proposed development program, prior to the filing of
the notification under regulation A. The releases contained represen-
tations which could not have been supported by reliable data for
inclusion in an offering circular. In addition to the violation of
section 5, the Commission also felt that the offering had been made
in violation of the "anti-fraud" provisions of section 17 (a) of the
Securities Act,27 thereby subjecting the offerors to additional civil
and criminal penalties. The issuer, its underwriter and their counsel
should, in the light of these pronouncements, be extremely careful
to avoid initiating an offering through public relations efforts that
are not in strict compliance with the statute and the rules. In addi-
tion, it should be borne in mind that the intent if not the letter of
the act requires the disclosure of the whole truth in making the
offer to the investor and, therefore, an offer telling only half of the
truth, no matter how innocuous that half-truth appears, probably
violates the spirit of the act. Of course, the problem of early and
misleading offers goes far beyond the realm of regulation A but it
is sufficiently extensive in scope to require the above brief coverage.
Sales material to be used in connection with the regulation A
offering must be filed under the requirements set forth in rule 258.28
Sales material is defined in that rule to include: "(a) every adver-
tisement, article or other communication proposed to be published
in any newspaper, magazine or other periodical; (b) the script of
every radio or television broadcast; and (c) every letter, circular or
other written communication proposed to be sent, given or other-
wise communicated to more than ten persons . . .
The best general guide to follow in the preparation of this
24 For the Commission's most recent significant opinion on this question, see Carl M. Loeb,
Rhodes & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5871 (February 10, 1959).
25 Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 48 Stat. 81, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77j (1958).
2648 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1958).
2748 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 
77
q(a) (1958).
28 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.258 (Supp. 1959).
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iaterial is the "full disclosure" philosophy of the Securities Act
and it would be well not to overlook the so-called "anti-fraud"
provisions of section 17 of that act.2 9 It would appear that infor-
mation that could be contained in the offering circular is proper
for use in sales material although one would not have to include all
the information required to be contained in the offering circular.
In this regard it should be noted that an offering circular meeting
the requirements of rule 256 (a) must be given to an individual prior
to or with the delivery of sales material directed to that person since
such sales material would constitute a written offer.30 The only
exceptions to this requirement of delivery of an offering circular
to an offeree are the simple advertisement merely announcing the
offering, requirements of which are set forth in rule 256 (c) ,31 and
situations where the issuer complies with the provisions of rule
257 which exempts the issuer from the requirements of using an
offering circular in offerings not exceeding $50,000.32
IV
If the issuer has recently made a public offering claiming the
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, provided by section 3(a) (11) thereof
33
(the so-called "intra-state" offering exemption), additional prob-
lems may be raised in preparing the filing and making the offering
under regulation A. In general, that section exempts from the regis-
tration requirements of the act, securities that are part of a public
issue offered and sold only to residents of the state where the
issuer resides or, if a corporation, its state of incorporation. The
issuer must also perform a substantial portion of its business opera-
tions within that state. Although the mails and any of the means
and instruments of interstate commerce may be used in making
the offering and although there is no stated dollar limitation on the
amount of the offering, the section 3 (a) (11) exemption is gen-
29 Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1958).
30 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. 230.256(a) (Supp. 1959):
"Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section and in . .. (Rule 257)-
(1) no written offer of securities of any issuer shall be made under . . . (this regulation)
unless an offering circular containing the information specified in Schedule I of Form 1-A is concur-
rently given or has previously been given to the person to whom the offer is made, or has been
sent to such person under such circumstances that it would normally have been received by him
at or prior to the time of such written offer; and
(2) no securities of such issuer shall be sold under . . . (this regulation) unless such an offering
circular is given to the person to whom the securities were sold, or is sent to such person under
such circumstances that it would normally be received by him, with or prior to any confirmation of
the sale, or prior to the payment by him of all or any part of the purchase price of the securities,
whichever first occurs."
31 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256(c) (Supp. 1959), which reads:
"Any written advertisement or other written communication, or any radio or television broad-
cast, which states from whom an offering circular containing the information specified in Schedule
I of Form 1-A may be obtained and in addition contains no more than the following information
may be published, distributed or broadcast at or after the commencement of the public offering
to any person prior to sending or giving such person a copy of such circular:
(1) the name of the issuer of such security;
(2) the title of the security, the amount being offered, and the per-unit offering price to the
public;
(3) the identity of the general type of business of the issuer; and
(4) a brief statement as to the general character and location of its property."
32 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. 5 230.257 (Supp. 1959).
3348 $tat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. I 77c(a)(11) (1958):
"(Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this title shall not apply to any
of the following classes of securities...)"
"Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within
a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing busi-
ness within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory."
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erally regarded as being somewhat hazardous.3 4 Several reasons
for this general opinion are: it is difficult from a practical stand-
point to limit offers solely to residents; the issuer may unknowingly
sell to a person who is merely acting as an agent for a nonresident
principal; and the offer or sale of one of the securities to a non-
resident would vitiate the exemption for a sale that had been made
pursuant to a good exemption many months before. Loss of the
exemption results in a situation of probably having sold in violation
of the registration requirements of the act and would probably
subject the issuer and possibly others to civil suit under the civil
liability provisions of the act.
Once it is determined that the exemption offered by section
3(a) (11) has been claimed for the public offering, an immediate.
question is raised concerning its validity in light of the proposed
offering under regulation A.3 5 upon reading that section it becomes
clear that the problem involves the wording itself, which requires
that all offers and sales of the total issue of securities be confined
solely to residents of the state where the issuer resides, or is incor-
porated, and does business. In other words, the entire issue offered
for sale under section 3(a) (11) must be confined to residents of
the particular state and this exemption may not be used in combi-
nation with any other exemption or registered offering which would
result in a public offering of a part of the issue to nonresidents.
Initially, it must be realized that the term "issue" has a specialized
meaning. If offerings by an issuer which are separate can be con-
sidered integrated because of, among other things, the similarity of
the security offered, the similarity of purpose and use of receipts
of the offering, the similarity of the consideration received, or the
nearness in time of the offerings, then the offerings would probably
be part of the same issue. Conversely, each offering would be con-
sidered a separate issue if they were sufficiently different to be
non-integrated. Thus, it is apparent that if the recent offering to
residents under the section 3 (a) (11) exemption may be integrated
with the offering pursuant to regulation A which may constitute an
offer to nonresidents, the issuer loses the exemption for the previous
offering to residents as soon as an offer is made to a nonresident
even though that subsequent offer is made pursuant to another
exemption. Therefore, since the exemption is considered lost for
prior sales, it follows that those prior sales may have been made in
violation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
There are several consequences that flow from this conclusion.
Under the terms and conditions of regulation A, specifically rule
254 (a) (3) thereof,36 the issuer must include, for purposes of com-
puting the total amount of securities being offered, all securities sold
.4 For a recent interesting case painting out some of the hazards of this exemption, see SEC
v. Hillsbarough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958).
35The question is raised by the mechanics of item 9 of Form 1-A under regulation A, which
requires the disclosure of certain information regarding the issuance of any securities by the issuer
and certain others within the one year prior to the filing of the Form I-A. At this point the number
of shares issued, the consideration received and an indication of whether or not the issuance in.
volved a public offering are revealed. The statement required by item 
9
(c) provides the crux of the
problem. There the issuer is required to state the exemption relied upon for the salcs listed in
item 9(a).
36 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(3) (Supp. 1959).
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in violation of section 5 (a) of the act 3 7 within one year prior to
the commencement of the proposed offering. Therefore, if the
issuer had sold $100,000 of stock to residents of its state of residence
or incorporation within the one-year period claiming the section
3 (a) (11) exemption and if that offering and the proposed offering
are integrated, it could now only offer $200,000 of stock claiming
the exemption provided by regulation A, in order to stay within its
$300,000 limitation.
The second major consequence arises in connection with
necessary disclosures to be contained in the offering circular. Ii,
under the above suggested circumstances, the issuer should deter-
mine that it has in fact sold securities in violation of section 5 of
the Securities Act, it would probably follow that the issuer would
be liable to all of the purchasers of the securities sold in violation,
under the provisions of section 12 of the act 38 if suit were appro-
priately brought by them. Thus, for adequate disclosure, it would
ordinarily be necessary to reflect the total amount of such con-
tingent liability at an appropriate place in the offering circular.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped the foregoing discussion will aid those attorneys who
are faced with the prospect of advising and assisting a client who
is making a public offering pursuant to regulation A. While the
problems raised and analyzed are common, they by no means per-
vade every offering carried out under regulation A. The normal
filing and offering, if approached with a minimum amount of
caution and preparation, should not pose any great difficulty from
the standpoint of the regulation and its background statute. The
attorney facing the prospect of a regulation A offering for the first
time may gain confidence from the fact that the staff of the Com-
mission's regional offices are usually available to provide assistance
prior to the time any filing is made. Finally, even though the
preparation and guidance of a regulation A offering does entail
some work, it is the conclusion of most thoughtful attorneys that
the exemption provides the most satisfactory solution short of the
burdensome requirements of registration while still providing the
investor the protection that he deserves.
37 Securities Act of 1933, 5 5(a), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 77e(a) (1958) (prohibitions
relating to interstate commerce and the mail).
38 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958).
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The common law governing the non-trespassory invasion of
the peaceful and exclusive use and enjoyment of one's land has its
roots deep in legal history. Most of the legislative land-use regula-
tions in the form of zoning ordinances, building codes, housing
codes, and related enactments, developed after 1898 when the
pioneer architect, Daniel Burnham, discovered how to build sky-
scrapers.1 Obviously, these statutes, codes, and ordinances apply to
the same subject matter as the common law of nuisance, but in
many instances they do not concur with the common law. This note
analyzes the effect in law and equity of these statutory enactments
on the common law of nuisance.
INTRODUCTION
"Nuisance" is a general term, rather than a term referring to
a specific tort.2 As pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, the
failure to observe this fact has led to confusion in the law.3 Certain
terms of classification are used with precise meaning, however, and
these are defined below in the manner in which they are used here.4
With reference to the effect of the act, nuisances may be public
or private. A public nuisance is one which affects similarly (but
not necessarily in the same degree) all persons coming within the
1 This history has been reviewed many times by the courts when evaluating the general legality
of zoning ordinances, e.g., the leading case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 282 U.S. 365,
386 (1926).
2 Prosser, Torts § 70, comment (2d ed. 1955).
3 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 110, 169 P.2d 171, 173 (1946).
4 Derived from King v. Columbia Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Black, Law Dictionary
1215 (4th ed. 1951); 3 Bouvier, Law Dictionary 2379-84 (Rawle's 3d Rev. 1914); Joyce, Nuisances chs.
1-2 (1906); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at 389-90; Webster, New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dic-
tionary 1146 (1954); 28A Words and Phrases 647-56 (Perm. ed., 1955) (nuisance); 35 Id. 172-74 (public
nuisance); 33 Id. 693-97 (private nuisance); and 27 Id. 406-07 (mixed nuisance).
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extent of the range of operation of the act. A private nuisance is
one which causes pecuniary loss in the property interest of an in-
dividual or a few persons, or one which causes danger or sub-
stantial discomfort to the person or persons having an interest in
the use and enjoyment of the property affected. Mixed nuisances
are both public and private.
Nuisances classified by the character of the act itself include
nuisances per se (nuisance at law), statutory nuisances, and
nuisances per accidens (nuisance in fact). A nuisance per se is a
nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, regardless of
location or surroundings. A statutory nuisance is an act which has
been declared to be a nuisance by legislative enactment, and fre-
quently is defined by the statute as a misdemeanor. A nuisance per
accidens is a lawful act which may become a nuisance by reason of
the circumstance or of the location and surroundings. This last test
of nuisance is sometimes called the "pig in the parlor" test, as given
in the dictum by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.5
The normal rules of equity jurisdiction apply fully in the
nuisance field: notably, the refusal of the equity court to enjoin
the possible commission of a criminal act, the refusal of equity to
act when there is an adequate remedy at law, and the refusal of
equity to act when the balancing of the equities of the case does
not show a remedy which will result in substantial justice.
Public nuisances are offenses against the state, and hence only
the state may act to abate the nuisance or to punish the offender.
In contrast, a private nuisance inflicts special damage on specific
property owners, and the property owners so adversely affected
may bring civil suit for injunction or for recovery of damages.
Equity will not enjoin a criminal nuisance, with the possible excep-
tion of a purpresture.6 However, private nuisances may be enjoined,
and under some circumstances, a public nuisance may also be
enjoined if the hazard is great enough. A public nuisance may also
be a private nuisance if it results in special damage to particular
property owners, and provided that the special damage is different
in character from the element causing the public nuisance. In such
an event, both sets of rules i.e., rules governing both public and
private nuisances apply to the act.
If the nuisance is of the type which is subject to equity jurisdic-
tion, the court will enjoin a nuisance per se before it has been com-
menced. It may also enjoin a nuisance per accidens before the act
has commenced if the evidence is undisputed that the act in that
location would be a nuisance, no matter how carefully conducted.
Clearly, then, no zoning ordinance is necessary to support a suit
for an injunction against a potential nuisance per accidens, prior to
the commencement of the use.7 However, in the absence of a zon-
ing ordinance or restrictive covenant, courts are reluctant to grant
5282 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
6 An obstruction to a public way.
7 Mutual Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 257 Ala. 354, 58 So. 2d 770, 774 (1952).
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such injunctions against any lawful use.8 A recent Pennsylvania
decision has gone even further by stating unequivocally: "When
owners of real estate in a residential area desire to preserve their
neighborhood in an unchanged condition, they must secure ap-
propriate zoning ordinances or be protected by building restric-
tions."9
One of the strongest cases in this group is Dill v. Excel Pack-
ing Co.,10 decided late in 1958 by the Kansas Supreme Court. In this
case, a suburban subdivision was opened some six miles from
Wichita in an agricultural area. The County Commissioners had
zoned to a depth of three miles from the city limits, but the devel-
opers located this subdivision beyond that zoning control. In a
strongly-worded opinion, the court observed that if one wants to
enjoy the advantages of country life and to escape the limitations
and costs of city living, he must also accept the disadvantages of a
rural environment, including the absence of legislative or equity
protection against the operation across the road of a feed-lot for
3,000 head of cattle.
Government, particularly on the municipal level, commonly
regulates the use of land as a means of accomplishing affirmative
public ends. This is an exercise of the police power, and involves
no compensation to the owners as distinguished from eminent
domain proceedings. The effects on adjacent land owners are merely
incidental, and are not relevant to the issues either of the legitimacy
of the ends or of appropriateness of the means. It is the effect of
this group of enactments, as contrasted to statutory nuisances,
which is examined in this note.
The exercise of the police power may take several forms. In
the first form, the government may establish a land use incidentally
to a direct exercise of its police powers. For instance, a city might
develop and operate.a park or an airport.
The second form of exercise of the police power consists of the
order to, or authorization of, a specific private party to devote spe-
8 Roberts v. Rich, 200 Ga. 322, 37 S.E.2d 401 (1946); Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d
281 (1941); Garrett v. Borough of Beaver, 367 Pa. 626, 81 A.2d 900 (1951); Menger v. Pass, 367 Pa.
432, 80 A.2d 702 (1951). But see Yaffe v. City of Fort Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S.W.2d 886 (1928);
Densmore v. Evergreen Camp W. of W., 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255 (1910).
9 Menger v. Pass, 367 Pa. 432, 80 A.2d 702, 703 (1951).
10 183 Kan. 513, 311 P.2d 539 (1958). Compare People ex rel. Gershberg v. Arkow, 204 Misc. 635,
124 N.Y.S.2d 704 (New York City Magis. Ct. 1953) (converse proposition: if people want city conveni-
ences, they must also tolerate city inconveniences).
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cific land to a specific use. Most commonly, this takes the form of a
franchise either to a public utility for the installation of power
lines or service mains, or to a railroad or transit company for the
construction of tracks and related structures. Occasionally, the
specific use is not clearly "vested with the public interest" as the
examples cited.
The third form of exercising the police power is a general
limitation on the private development of land for the promotion of
the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. This has been a long
and increasingly complex development of the law, paralleling the
growth of urban communities and the increasing mechanization of
all aspects of modern life. 1
Four of the five most common land use regulations have only
one or two clearly defined public purposes. Probably the earliest
of the four was fire districting, in which certain areas of the city
were designated, and within those areas, no construction materials
below a certain level of fire resistance could be used. Obviously,
these regulations were enacted as a reaction to the great conflag-
rations which swept most modern cities at some time during their
early years, such as the Denver fire of 1863 and the famous Chicago
fire. A decision upholding such regulations was rendered as early
as 1838 in New York.12 These regulations have remained essentially
without change in form or purpose to the present day.
13
Until 1898, the construction methods of the times limited the
height of buildings without any need for legislation. However, the
technology of skyscraper construction was discovered in that year,
and almost at once, a problem arose from the fact that the build-
ings were being built higher than water could be raised in fire
hoses. Again as an obvious fire protection measure, major cities
began to limit the height of buildings.' 4 These regulations soon
merged into zoning ordinances. With modern construction practices
of using standpipes, sprinkler systems, automatic fire alarm sys-
tems, and highly fire-resistive materials, absolute height limit re-
quirements are either being retained for other purposes or grad-
ually are disappearing altogether.' 5
The modern building code is a somewhat more complex reg-
ulation, covering both fire-resistive qualities and the strength of
materials. Some reasons for the regulation are: (1) fire protection,
and (2) need for strength to support both natural loads such as the
weight of snow and the pressure of winds, and artificial loads such
as machinery.' 6
Housing codes came into being about 1900, with the New York
City Tenement House Act, regulating "railroad flats." Since then,
11 See the review of the development of this body of low in the leading case of Gorieb v. Fox,
274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927).
12 Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261 (New York Ch. 1838).
13 E.g., Denver, Colo., Building Code §§ 601-05 (1949, as amended), which is the most recent version
of a fire districting system started by Denver, Colo., Ordinance 92, Series of 1873. (The Denver Build-
ing Code is not part of the Denver Rev. Municipal Code, and is published separately.)
14 See Welch v. Swosey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907); Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70
Atl. 113 (1908).
15 E.g., compare height limits in Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, § 610 prior to 1955 ("1925 zon.
ing ordinance") with the present provisions in that section relating to bulk planes.
16 E.g., Denver, Colo., Building Code, Ordinance 140, (1949, as amended).
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the codes have become more comprehensive and increasingly
strict in the definitions of housing fit for human occupancy. Char-
acteristically, these codes contain minimum standards of space per
person, amount of light and air required within the structure, and
water and sanitation installations. The purpose is preservation of
the public health, primarily through control of contagious diseases.
Most major American cities now have such regulations.
17
The fifth type of land-use regulation is zoning. It differs in
character from the preceding four types of regulation primarily
because of its complexity of purpose and because of its regulation
of the geographic location of land use as well as the manner of land
use. Legally, zoning and nuisance are not the same,' 8 but the two
elements of difference between zoning and the other regulations
have led zoning to be widely mistaken for some sort of codified
nuisance legislation. This error may not be explicit, but it is back
of every application for an amendment, a variance, an exception,
or legal relief from allegedly unreasonable regulations, when those
requests are based on the plea that the neighbors do not object, or
that the proposed exemption would not hurt the other property
owners in the area. In law, the zoning ordinance is a vehicle for
achieving a number of public ends simultaneously. The standard
statement of zoning purpose is:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen congestion in
the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other
dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowd-
ing of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements.
Such regulations shall be made with reasonable considera-
tion, among other things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view
to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land. .. 19
Almost every zoning enabling act in the country contains this
exact language.
20
Different problems are presented by (1) complying with the
permissive aspects of these ordinances, and (2) violating the pro-
hibitive aspects of these ordinances.
17 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 630 (1950, as amended).
18 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 282 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (in considering zoning, one rea-
sons by analogy from the field of nuisance); Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d
865, 869 (1953) (nuisance is not the basis of zoning); Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 111,
169 P.2d 171, 173 (1946) (zoning preempts the field of public nuisance); Webb v. Alexander, 202 Ga.
436, 43 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1947) (violation of a zoning ordinance is not a public nuisance). Contra, a
series of Louisiana cases, of which New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798, 799 (1924)
is the leading case, holding that a violation of a zoning ordinance is a nuisance per se. See also the
text accompanying notes 50-61 infra regarding the effect of compliance with a regulatory ordinance on
the issue of private nuisance, and text accompanying notes 62-74 infra regarding equity jurisdiction
over violation of a regulatory ordinance.
19 U.S. Department of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3 (1924), in G. B. Smith,
Law and Pratice of Zoning 429 (1937).




LAND USE NuISANCE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMVENT
For the purpose of this discussion, governments must be di-
vided into two classes: the state and its political subdivisions, and
the governmental corporations vested with general or limited
municip-l tiwers. The first class consists of the state itself, coun-
ties and school districts. Counties and school districts, as agencies
of the state, exercise the delegated sovereign power of the state.
The second group is comprised of cities and towns,21 and a wide
variety of special districts organized to carry out limited functions
such as fire protection, sewage removal, and provision of water.
22
The first group of governments presumably exercise only the
sovereign power of the state. 23 Historically, the exercise of this
sovereign power was immune both from suit and from liability,
under the common law maxim: "The King can do no wrong." In
this analysis, it is presumed that immunity from suit has been
waived.
24
The common law immunity from liability is carried over most
strongly in the equity court, where no injunction would be granted
against the operation of a structure maintained as an incident to
the exercise of the police power, such as a courthouse.
25
However, at law damages were allowed for personal injuries
resulting from the maintainance of a nuisance incidental to an
exercise of the police power;26 and, under certain circumstances, so
were damages for injury to property interests. Two different
theories were used to grant this latter relief. In some states, the
tort liability theory was ignored, and recovery was allowed under
the eminent domain theory that property could not be damaged
for a public purpose without the payment of just compensation.
2 7
In other states, recovery for property damage resulting from main-
tenance of a public facility may be recovered under a nuisance lia-
bility theory.28
The second class of governmental units, existing in corporate
form with limited or general municipal powers, is considered in
most instances to exist for "the improvement of their own terri-
tory and the property of their citizens. ' 29 These municipal powers
are frequently termed "proprietary powers," and include busi-
nesses run by the city such as utility systems30 and transportation
21 Colo. Const., amend. XX; Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 139 (1953).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 88 (1953).
23 However, the once-clear character of counties has gradually become blurred as they assume
municipal powers to govern unincorporated urban areas. See Farnik v. County Comm'rs, 341 P.2d 467
(Colo. 1959).
24 See Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
25 Liebman v. Richmond, 103 Cal. App. 354, 284 Poc. 731 (1930).
26 Id. (dictum); cases cited in Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
27 Dayton v. Ashville, 185 N.C. 12, 115 S.E. 827 (1923); see Colo. Const., art. II, 1 15.
28 District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 562 (1925), and
numerous cases cited therein; State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698 (OhioC.P. 1947).29 Portsmouth v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 113 Ohio St. 250, 148 N.E. 846, 847 (1925).
30 Harms v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W.2d 287 (1942) (water); Portsmouth v. Mitchell
Mfg. Co., supra note 29, (sewers); cases cited in Annat., 43 A.L.R. 961 (1925) (sewers).
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systems,3 1 and governmental activities having no state counter-
part.
32
A land use operated under a proprietary power is subject to
the same liability as though that land were operated by private
interests. Normally, the uses can not be enjoined in advance, since
it is presumed that (1) the activity is not a nuisance per se; and
(2) that the activity will not be so conducted as to become a nuis-
ance per accidens.33 Since municipalities derive their authority from
the state, the law for exercise of that authority is pursuant to
statutory or constitutional authorization. Hence, it cannot be a
public nuisance.34 In evaluating a private nuisance per accidens,
the court weighs the equities in determining what, if any, abate-
ment should be ordered.3 5 When such a nuisance is conducted by
a municipality, the public necessity aspect of the activities weighs
heavily against any total abatement, and most partial abatements.36
In general, this same strong public utility aspect does not apply
when damages are the issue. Damages usually are awarded unless
the nuisance is the very thing authorized by the state.
37
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION OF USES VESTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST
Whenever an owner devotes his land to public use, or to a use
for the benefit of the public, his activity becomes vested with the
public interest, and subject to a greater degree of governmental
regulation than ordinary private enterprise.3 8 The most common
examples of these enterprises vested with the public interest are
privately-owned public utilities (water, sewage removal, electric-
ity, gas); common carriers, and communication transmission en-
terprises (telephone, telegraph, television, radio). Within any geo-
graphic region, other particular uses, such as grain elevators,
39
irrigation ditch companies,40 and coal mines41 may also become
vested with the public interest.
The degree of public importance varies, both between differ-
ent kinds of enterprise and within any given enterprise. Some
uses are granted the power of eminent domain, 42 and others are
merely regulated.43 For the purposes of developing the statement
of law on the former type of enterprise, railroading is used as the
31 David v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1923); cases cited in Annot..
31 A.L.R. 1306 (1924).
32 Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288 (8th Cir. 1903) (dumps are municipal, not sovereign); Williams v.
Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (parks are proprietary). Far development of the general
disagreement regarding the legal nature of waste and garbage collection and disposal, see cases cited
in Annot., 63 A.L.R. 334 (1929); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 718 (1945); and Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1957).
33 City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926).
34 State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, Y9 N.E.2d 698, 707 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
35 City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926); cases cited in Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d
1135 (1957), and Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1955).
36 State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
37 Cases cited in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1955) and Annot.. 156 A.L.R. 718 (1945).
38Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
39 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. ,113 (1876).
40 Colo. Rev. Stat., J 50-2-1 (1953).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 92-12-1 (1953).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 50-2-1 (1953). See also comments in Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 N.J.L.
235, 13 AtI. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (significance of eminent domain in determining degree of public in-
terest).
43 H. H. Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958); State v. WOR-TV Tower, 39 N.J.
Super. 583, 121 A.2d 764, 767 (Ch. 1956).
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example.4 4 The same general principles apply to other privately-
owned enterprises having the power of eminent domain.
45
The very purpose for which a railroad is created is the carry-
ing of persons and freight on trains moving on tracks. Hence, the
railroad is not liable for incidental nuisance which might result
from the proper carrying out of the function of running trains on
tracks.46 However, in Colorado, the power of eminent domain
granted to the railroads requires the payment for damage to private
property adversely affected by the operation, irrespective of the law
of nuisance.
47
The problem of terminals, roundhouses, switching yards, and
other accessory structures and uses is treated somewhat differently
among the various states. A majority of states hold that these are
essential activities to railroading, and, if properly operated, they
enjoy the same legislative immunity from nuisance liability as the
running of the train on the tracks. A minority, hold that the loca-
tion of these facilities is optional with the railroad, and hence is es-
sentially private in character. In these minority states, there is no
absolute immunity from nuisance liability, but a strong public in-
terest enters into the weighing of the equities in injunction ac-
tions.
48
Regardless of whether the state in question follows the majority
or the minority view on the issue of whether a properly operated
facility constitutes a nuisance, there is unanimity in the view that
if the nuisance results from the improper operation of any facility,
the actor is liable. The legislative authorization was only for the
properly operated function, and not for the nuisance. 49
When the use affected with the public interest is merely regu-
lated, it has full liability for private nuisance, but no liability for
public nuisance.
COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL PERMISSION LEGISLATION
Many municipal regulations permit or authorize various clas-es
of land uses provided that such uses are conducted in ac-ordan e
with the provisions of the ordinance. The effect of such ordinances
on the law of nuisance has been the subject of considerable con-
fusion, largely due to the use of overly-inclusive terminology. With-
in the last decade and a half, the courts have been engaged in clari-
fying the effects of these regulatory ordinances on various types
of nuisance.
The Colcrado Supreme Court holds that a zoning ordinance
pre-empts the field of public nuisance.5" Several older cases added
the proposition that a use permitted by a zoning ordinance, and
44 This discussion is based on cases cited in Annots. at 69 A.L.R. 1188 (1930), 6 A.L.R. 723 (1920),
and 6 A.L.R. 713 (1920), supplemented by specific later cases as indicated.
45 Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517 (1956).
46 Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 NJ.L. 235, 13 Ati. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
47 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 50-1-1 (1953).
48 Van Cortlondt v. New York Cent. R.R., 139 Misc. 892, 250 N.Y.S. 298, 314 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1931), rev'd, 238 App. Div. 132, 263 N.Y.S. 842 (1933), rev'd, 265 N.Y. 249, 192 N.E. 401 (1934).
49 Cf. Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 32 N.J. Super. 538, 108 A.2d 660 (Ch. 1954).
50 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
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operated in a careful and efficient manner, cannot be enjoined as
a nuisance per se.51
In the field of private nuisance, the majority rule appears to be
that the zoning ordinance is not a bar to the institution of an action
against a nuisance per accidens. The equity courts are divided on
whether injunctive relief may be granted against such activities
as are permitted by the zoning ordinance, and operated in a careful
and efficient manner. Precedent is not strong in the equity court,
and hence the courts do not feel bound by the earlier decisions in
terms of the nature of relief granted in any specific case. Within
this limitation, there is some indication that Colorado,
52 New York,53
Oklahoma, 54 and Pennsylvania55 would tend to refuse injunctive
relief against an activity which is permitted by a zoning ordinance,
and which is carefully and efficiently conducted. The states of
51 Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759 (1933); Salvation Army v. Frankenstein, 22 Ohio App.
159, 153 N.E. 277, 278 (1926); Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 Pac. 976, 978
(1922). See also Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, supra note 50; Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Fiorella, 273
Ky. 549, 117 S.W.2d 173, 177 (1938) (conformity with fire prevention code).
52 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
53 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932); Key v. Pearliris
Realty Corp., 106 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Contra, Sweet v. Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146, 25 N.E.2d
963 (1940); Moore v. United States Crematorium Co., 158 Misc. 621, 286 N.Y.S. 639 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County), rev'd, 247 App. Div. 637, 291 N.Y.S.289 (1936), rev'd, 275 N.Y. 105, 9 N.E.2d 795, (1937).
54 Weaver v. Bishop, 174 Okla. 492, 52 P.2d 853 (1935) (contains a good analysis of the legal de-
velopment of this point up to that date).
55 Walker v. Delaware County Trust Co., 314 Pa. 257, 171 AtI. 458 (1934). But see Appeal of Per-
rin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 AtI. 305 (1931).
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Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas
appear to hold the view that the provisions of a proper zoning
ordinance are persuasive but not controlling on the issue of
whether injunctive relief should be granted under these condi-
tions.56 Spot zoning57 is not persuasive or controlling.5 8
Prior to 1935, California also held that a use could be enjoined
as a nuisance, even when permitted by the zoning ordinance and
operated in a careful and efficient manner.59
In 1935, section 731a of the California Code of Civil Procedure
was adopted, reading in part:
"Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall
have established zones or districts under authority of law
wherein certain manufacturing or commercial uses are ex-
pressly permitted, no person or persons, firm or corporation
shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunction process
from the necessary operation in any such commercial or
industrial zone of any use expressly permitted therein;
nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence
of the employment of unnecessary and injurious methods
of operation."
A series of subsequent cases indicates that the effect of this leg-
islation is to put California among the states holding that injunc-
tive relief will not be granted against uses conducted in accord with
zoning ordinances, if such uses are conducted carefully and effici-
ently.6 0
If the permitted use results in a nuisance per accidens, law
courts will award damages.6 1
VIOLATION OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES
Violation of regulatory ordinances has, by definition, the legal
remedy of fine or imprisonment or both. Relief may also be had
through injunction or abatement proceedings in some circumstances.
Early cases held that violation of a regulatory ordinance would
not confer jurisdiction on an equity court for granting an injunc-
tion. If the "merely" illegal act was also a common law nuisance,
it could be enjoined, but the issue of illegality was irrelevant to
56 Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, 236 Ala. 4, 81 So. 2d 535, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); Dawson
v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950); Weltshe v. Graf, 323 Mass. 498, 82 N.E.2d 795
(1948); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W.2d 636 (1951); Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service
Corp., 136 N.J. Eq. 571, 43 A.2d 15 (Ch. 1945); Stohf v. Passaic Piece Dye Works, 108 N.J. Eq. 46, 153
AtI. 707, (Ch. 1931); Dunaway v. Austin, 290 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
57 Spot zoning is the establishment of a different zone on a land area than that zone applied to
the surrounding area, when the difference is for the peculiar benefit of the owner of the land rather
than for the public interest; a type of unconstitutional private legislation.
58 Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wash. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 407 (1952); Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, 236 Ala. 4,
81 So. 2d 535 (1955) (dictum).
59 Fendley v. City of Anaheim, 110 Cal. App. 731, 294 Pac. 769 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Williams v.
Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 Pac. 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926).
60 Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948); Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d
348, 203 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); North Side Property Owners Ass'n v. Hillside Memorial Park,
70 Cal. App. 2d 609, 161 P.2d 618 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945); McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. 2d 315,
154 P.2d 428 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
61 Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955); Robinson Brick Co. v.
luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946); Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939)
(contains a review of the law to that date).
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the proceedings.6 2 However, when it was questionable whether the
act was a common law nuisance, an ordinance declaring the act to
be a nuisance coupled with a showing of special damages was
adequate to sustain an action for injunction.
63
A few states define the violation of a zoning ordinance to be
a public nuisance, and judically authorize injunctive proceedings.
6 4
More commonly, however, legislative authorization is employed to
aid in enforcement of the zoning regulations.
65
The courts of the various states are in conflict in their attitude
toward parties in injunctive proceedings. Some hold that a private
citizen is not entitled to an injunction against a violation of the
zoning ordinance, since this is a public nuisance.6 6 Others hold that
if the zoning violation is also a nuisance per accidens, it may be
enjoined by citizen action.67 Still others have held that a zoning
violation is a nuisance per se, and hence enjoinable by citizen action
at any time.6 8 In Colorado, as in many other states, this last right
is established by statute.
6 9
A nonconforming use under a zoning ordinance is a special
problem. It is a use which was lawful when the zoning ordinance
was adopted (or amended), but which does not comply with the
zoning ordinance at the time in question. Technically, its status is
that of a use which is tolerated but not encouraged. In general, leg-
islatively-imposed limitations on its continuance have been up-
held;70 but in the absence of such limitations, the courts tend to treat
62 Philbrick v. Miami, 147 Fla. 538, 3 So. 2d 144 (1941) (zoning); Jacobsen v. Padgett, 108 So. 2d
303 (Fla. App. 1958) (zoning); First National Bank v. Sarils, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N.E. 434 (1891) (fire
zones); Houlton v. Titcomb, 102 Me. 272, 66 AtI. 733 (1906) (fire zones); Village of Port Austin v. Par-
sons, 349 Mich. 629, 85 N.W.2d 120 (1957) (setback ordinances); Village of St. Johns v. McFarlan, 33
Mich. 72 (1875) (fire zones); Warren v. Cavanaugh, 33 Mo. App. 102 (1888) (location of stone quar-
ries); Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) (size and location of pressed hay factory in .fire
zone); Wampum v. Moore, 34 Wis. 450 (1874) (fire zones).
6 Levine v. Board of Adjustment, 125 Conn. 478, 7 A.2d 222 (1939); Town of Grundy Center v.
Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); Eskridge v. San-
dusky, 136 N.E.2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1955); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wright, 124 Okla. 55, 254 Pac. 41
(1927); Shields v. Spokane School Dist., 31 Wash. 2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948).
64 New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924); New Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So.
2d 270 (La. App. 1952); Morris v. Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (App. Div.
1952) (slightly modified); Riccardi v. Board of Adjustment, 394 Pa. 624, 149 A.2d 50 (1959); Molnar v.
George B. Henne & Co., 377 Pa. 571, 105 A.2d 325 (1954).
65 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 139-60-8 (1953); Denver City Charter, § 219A-H (1953 compilation); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946); Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union,
318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947); Young v. Scheu, 56 Hun 307, 9 N.Y.S. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1890). Cf.
Webb v. Alexander, 202 Ga. 436, 43 S.E.2d 668 (1947), which holds that a zoning violation may be
enjoined under an enabling statute relative t, public nuisance if the violation is proved to be a public
nuisance.
66 City and County of Son Francisco v. Safeway Stores, 150 Cal. App. 2d 327, 310 P.2d 68 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957); O'Brien v. Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N.E. 886 (1926).
67 Hopkins v. MacCullock, 35 Cal. App. 2d 442, 95 P.2d 950 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Biber v. O'Brien,
138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P.2d 425 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934); Smith v. Collison, 119 Cal. App. 180, 6 P.2d 277
(Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946); Morris v.
Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (App. Div. 1952); Scott v. Champion Bldg. Co.,
28 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
68 McCartney v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 358, 54 N.W.2d 462 (1952); Stale ex ref. Demo Realty Co. v.
McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 230 U.S. 556 (1929); State v. Lew, 25 Wash. 2d 854,
172 P.2d 289 (1946).
69 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat., 1 139.60-7 (1953); Denver City Charter, I 219A-G (1953 compilation). These
means are indirect, involving proceedings before the Board of Adjustment by "persons aggrievea,"
alleging error by the administrator in deciding not to enforce; reviewable by the courts on writ of
certiorari. This approach does not appear to have been used.
70 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Beszedes
v. Board of Comm'rs of Arapahoe County, 116 Colo. 123, 178 P.2d 950 (1947); Mercer Lumber Com-
panies v. Village of Glencoe, 390 III. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945); Dorman v. Baltimore, 187 Md. 678,
51 A.2d 658 (1947); Borough of Rockleigh v. Astral Industries, 23 N.J. Super. 255, 92 A.2d 851 (Ch.
1952); D' Agnostino v. Jaguar Realty Co., 22 N.J. Super. 74, 91 A.2d 500 (Ch. 1952).
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such uses as if they were conforming uses, authorized by the zoning
ordinancel Of course, an illegally issued permit does not change
the status of a zoning violation.
72
Abatement is the power to force the cessation of uses which
are clearly detrimental to the public health or safety or morals. It
frequently accompanies the grant of power to regulate land uses,
and sometimes serves as a substitute for the injunction.7 3 However,
in Colorado a public official abates a use at his peril.
74
SUMMARY
Regulatory land use statutes under the police power are not
legislative statements of the law of nuisance. However, when such
statutes deal with the same subject matter as common law public
nuisances, the statutes pre-empt the field.
In the field of private nuisance, a specific legislative authoriza-
tion bars injunctive relief against the "very" use authorized, pro-
vided that the use is conducted in a careful and efficient manner.
An improperly conducted use is not an authorized use. As the per-
mission shifts from mandatory to permissive, and as the degree of
public interest in the use decreases, the effect of the legislative
provisions shifts from being an absolute bar to injunctive relief to
being persuasive evidence. The legal remedy of damages remains
unaffected if the state is one requiring compensation for damages
to land incidental to eminent domain.
In general, violations of land use regulations were not within
the jurisdiction of equity, but this common law rule has generally
been superseded legislatively. However, a violation did not bar a
private nuisance action under the common law.
71 Firth v. Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 44 (1951); Benjamin v. Lietz, 116 Utah 476, 211 P.2d
449 (1949).
72 McCartney v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 358, 54 N.W:2d 462 (1952); Hyams v. Amchir, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 77
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
73 Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933); Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); First National Bank v. Sarlis, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N.E.
434 (1891); Burley v. City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 34 A.2d 603 (1943); People v. Kelly, 295 Mich.
632, 295 N.W. 341 (1940).
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It is evident that during the past twenty-five years the use of
the defense of "unavoidable accident" has been increasing in suits
involving automobile accidents. It would seem that the use of this
defense has increased proportionately with the increase in the
number of automobiles on the road. Could it be that this defense
has been overworked, and that some effort should be made to mini-
mize or limit its use? From various court opinions it is obvious that
some jurists are already opposed to the promiscuous use of this
defense. Mr. Justice Speer,' speaking for the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, said:
"We entertain very grave doubt that the question of
unavoidable accident was raised by the evidence, in this
case.... We do not think the various hazards suggested by
counsel argue anything in favor of unavoidable accident-
that is, from some cause other than the negligence of one of
the drivers. To our mind, they only present additional rea-
sons for the use of a greater degree of care on the part of
each to act prudently; that is, to conduct themselves at the
time, in the manner that a reasonably prudent person would
have acted under the same or similar circumstances. To fail
to do so would be negligence and take the case out of the
realm of unavoidable accident....
"It has only been during the last decade that our courts
have required of plaintiffs, seeking damages as a result of
negligence, to assume, in addition to the establishment of
negligence and proximate cause, the burden of showing that
their injuries were not sustained from some other cause-
that of unavoidable accident. However, this added responsi-
bility need not be determined, except and unless there is
evidence tending to show it. There is an inclination of some
of our courts to recognize the necessity of the submission of
that issue to the jury on very slight provocation, a proced-
ure to which we do not subscribe. We believe that issue,
like any other fact issue, should be supported by evidence
of a substantial nature and of such probative force as
would support an answer by the jury."2
In the case, the plaintiff's car had been sideswiped by a city
bus going in the opposite direction on a city street. No evidence was
introduced from which it could be deduced that the accident was
caused by anything but human error and carelessness. Despite the
appearance that the case was "open and shut," the defendant bus
company unsuccessfully based its appeal on the ground that the
trial court had committed prejudicial error in its instruction to
the jury on unavoidable accident.
3
1 Associate Justice, Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Fort Worth, from 1936 to 1950.
2 Hyde v. Marks, 138 S.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Tex, Civ. App. 1940).
3 Hyde v. Marks, supra note 2.
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Another court expressed a similar opinion of the problem in a
very succinct way by saying, "It must be rarely true that when two
people, moving toward a meeting point, both in control of their
movements and relative positions, actually collide, the collision can
be classed as an inevitable accident. ' '4
It is of interest that industrial safety experts attribute only two
per cent of industrial accidents to "unavoidability." 5 This same
source also concluded that approximately eighty-eight per cent of
all industrial accidents are caused by the unsafe acts of persons.,
It seems probable that the percentages of highway accidents which
are either caused by human error or are "unavoidable" would be
very similar to the percentages found in industrial accidents.
The purpose of this note is to examine the trend throughout the
past twenty-five to thirty years to establish how the defense of un-
avoidable accident has been used in automobile accident cases. No
attempt has been made to cover every case in every jurisdiction be-
cause of the overwhelmingly large number of pertinent cases. Ex-
amination of several cases suffices to point out some facets of this
problem. Texas and California have been among the "leaders" in
permitting the use of the defense of unavoidable accident, and are
among the largest contributors to our national highway accident
toll. Consequently they have furnished a large percentage of the
cases involving a plea of unavoidable accident, and many of the
cited cases are taken from these jurisdictions.
A general classification of types of collisions in which the
defense of unavoidable accident has been raised is as follows:
1) Collisions caused by a driver being blinded by bright lights,
poor weather conditions, blowing dust, or obstructions.
2) Collisions in which an automobile skids because of some
highway hazard.
3) Collisions in which some mechanical malfunction is instru-
mental in setting up the conditions leading to the mishap.
4) Collisions in which human error or negligence predomi-
nates as a proximate cause.
Automobile collisions in general, with but one exception, can
be fitted into one or more of these four groups. The one exception
is those collisions caused by a personal failure or mishap, such as
falling asleep at the wheel, driving while intoxicated, or some type
of seizure or illness striking a driver. These personal failures repre-
sent a category by themselves and could well be the subject of
separate study. No attempt is made here to cover this particular
type of accident, nor automobile-train accidents; nor is much
emphasis placed upon automobile-pedestrian accidents. Problems
concerning procedural matters and the presentation of evidence are
also left untouched.
4 Coplan v. Warner, 158 Md. 463, 149 Atl. 1, 3 (1930).




DEFINITIONS OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
An unavoidable accident is "an inevitable occurence, not to be
foreseen and prevented by vigilance, care, and attention,"7 and "is
not occasioned in any degree, directly or remotely, by want of
ordinary care on the part of either person."8 It is "an event which
occurs without the negligence of the plaintiff or defendant,"9 and
occurs "only when the disaster happens from natural causes without
negligence or fault on either side."' 0 It must be an occurrence
"which could not be avoided by that degree of prudence, foresight,
care, and caution which the law requires."" A jury issue of unavoid-
able accident is raised if the evidence shows that there was wet
pavement, skidding, existence of an obstacle that might obstruct the
view of the drivers, or some proximate cause other than the negli-
gence of one of the parties.12 For a mishap to be unavoidable, it is
not necessary.that it be physically impossible to prevent, but it must
be shown that ordinary care and diligence could not have pre-
vented it.'
3
Different views are taken as to the purpose of instructing a
jury upon unavoidable accident. Some jurisdictions feel that by
submitting an instruction on unavoidable accident, the matter will
be brought to the attention of the jury so they will understand it is
not mandatory to find that one of the parties to the suit was to
blame for the accident.14 Parker v. Womack, 15 a widely-cited case
in California, held, with a divided court, that it is a rare occasion
where instructions on unavoidable accident are not appropriate,
unless the defendant is found to be negligent as a matter of law.
This view has been followed many times in California.
The dissent in Parker was based upon the premise that if an
instruction upon unavoidable accident does not add anything to
instructions covering negligence, proximate cause, and burden of
proof, there is no reason to give an instruction on this subject. This
view also has been widely followed in California cases.16 It is
thought that the two rules are not incompatible because of the
narrow qualification in Parker that the instruction is appropriate
only where the question of negligence appears to be a question of
7 Washington, C. & A. Turnpike v. Case, 80 Md. 36, 45, 30 AtI. 571, 573 (1894); accord, Vizzini
v. Dopkin, 176 Md. 639, 6 A.2d 637 (1939).
8 Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Delahoussaye, 124 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
9 Southern Ice & Util. Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex. 82, 95 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1936); accord, Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Price, 114 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1938).
10 Uncapher v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 127 Ohio St. 351, 188 N.E. 553, 556 (1933).
11 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1931).
12Vergauwen v. Parsons, 294 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (dictum); Winn v. Taylor, 111
S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (dictum).
13 Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957).
14 Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 347, 153 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1941); Airline Motor Coaches,
Inc. v. Fields, 140 Tex. 221, 166 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942); Kuykendall v. Doose, 260
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Kincaid, 19 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929).
1537 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951); accord, McMahon v. Kern County Union High School &
College Dist., 150 Cal. App. 2d 218, 309 P.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1957); Hickenbottom v. Jeppesen, 143
Cal. App. 2d 327, 300 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1956); Carruthers v. Cunha, 133 Cal. App. 2d 91, 283 P. 2d 384
(Ct. App. 1955); Hooper v. Bronsan, 123 Cal. App. 2d 243, 266 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1954); Gall v.
Fowler, 124 Colo. 404, 238 P.2d 187 (1951) (defendant denied right to plead unavoidable accident
when shown that he made illegal U-turn).
16 Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500 (1958); Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co.,
111 Cal. App. 2d 626, 245 P.2d 583 (1952); McMahon v. Marshall, 111 Cal. App. 2d 248, 244 P.2d
481 (1952); accord, Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957); see Jaeger v. Chap-
man, 95 Cal. App. 2d 520, 213 P.2d 404 (1950).
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fact. It is likely that a court would permit the giving of such
instructions, unless the issue of negligence was not present by any
stretch of the imagination.
Where an accident is caused by negligence, there is no place
for application of the doctrine. In order to properly bring a case
within the rules of unavoidable accident, it is not sufficient that the
injury was inevitable at the time, because one who by his own
negligence has brought about, or failed to remedy, a dangerous con-
dition or situation is liable for a resulting injury to another. This is
true even though the injury could not have been prevented in view
of the conditions or situation existing at the time of the accident.
One who seeks to avail himself of the protection of the rule must
first show that he was in no way to blame for the happening. It is
also thought that a defendant who is responsible for his own negli-
gent act which by chance was combined with an unavoidable acci-
dent, cannot rightfully avail himself of the defense of unavoidable
accident.17
It is apparent from the definitions which the courts have
approved that the unavoidable accident is closely akin to those
catastrophes which the law categorized as acts of God, or vis major.
Black18 defines act of God as "an act occasioned exclusively by
violence of nature without the interference of any human agency.
It means a natural necessity proceeding from physical causes alone
without the intervention of man." Properly speaking, both acts of
God and unavoidable accidents may be denoted as inevitable acci-
dents, with the former being connected with natural forces, and the
latter being connected with human agency. In either case, there
is a freedom from human negligence, and the accident is one which
could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable caution
or prudence.
With freedom from negligence being one of the principal ele-
ments of an unavoidable accident, it is elementary that a defense
17 See Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957); Barlow v. North Sterling Irr. Dist.,
85 Colo. 488, 277 Pac. 469 (1929) (act of God must be sole cause, and if negligence of defendant
contributed to act of God in causing damage, defendant is liable); Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v.
Swartz, 83 Colo. 225, 263 Pac. 728 (1928).
18 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). See Blythe v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 15 Colo. 333, 25 Pac.
702 (1890) (wind); Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. Pitzer, 14 Colo. App. 123, 59 Poc. 420 (1899) (unprecedented
storm caused canal to overflow); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Andrews, 11 Colo. App. 204, 53 Pac. 518
(1898) (snowslide).
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of unavoidable accident cannot exist concurrently with general or
contributory negligence. Nor can the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
apply where an injury is inflicted by an act of God, or is the result
of an unavoidable accident. 19 As Mr. Justice Speer pointed out in
his attack upon the misuse of the defense of unavoidable accident, a
determination that the accident was unavoidable eliminates all
other theories of how the accident could have happened. Blashfield,
in his work on automobile law, says:
"A party is not entitled to an instruction on the theory
of an unavoidable accident, in the absence of any evidence
on which to base it, or upon pleadings not raising the issue
.... Also, where the accident could not have happened with-
out negligence or contributory negligence, it is error to
instruct as to unavoidable accident.
20
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND MECHANICAL MALFUNCTIONS
Reference to the definitions of unavoidable accident shows that
all of these definitions hinge upon the "reasonable and prudent
man" theory which requires that everyone be charged with respon-
sibility for those acts which could have been prevented by the
exercise of that care which the law requires. The Restatement of
Torts21 sums up the general rule thus:
"When an act is negligent if done without reasonable
care, the care which the actor is required to exercise to
avoid being negligent in the doing of the act is that which
he, as a reasonable man, should recognize as necessary to
prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm
to another.
22
Hand in hand with this rule concerning the duty of a reason-
ably prudent man when doing an act which would be negligence
if not done with reasonable care, is another rule:
"It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a
human being or thing, which the actor knows or should
know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or defective,
that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.
23
Comment c, of the same rule, expands this theory, by saying
in part:
[TIhe duty of preparation includes a generally
operative duty of inspection where the circumstances are
such as would lead a reasonable man to believe that an in-
spection is necessary, as where the thing used is one likely
to deteriorate by previous use or other causes or where the
actor has some other reason for suspecting that the article
19 Frenkil v. Johnson, 175 Md. 592, 3 A.2d 479 (1939).
-20 tOc SBashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 6698 (perm, ed. 1957).
_21-Restatement, Torts § 298 (1934).
22 See also Id. § 289 (when the actor should recognize the existence of risk); id. 1 302 (acts involving
risk of either direct or indirect harm).
23 Id. § 307.
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may be defective. '24
It would seem from these three rules defining the general re-
sponsibilities of a reasonable man in either performing hazardous
acts or using instrumentalities which could be dangerous if not
properly used, that these rules would be applicable to automobiles.
Automobiles, like any other machines, tend to deteriorate with .age
and use. Malfunctions may occur at any time, and while most of
them would be inconsequential, some could result in calamity if
the failure were to occur while one were driving. What duty does
John Q. Citizen owe to his fellow man to maintain his automobile
in the best possible operating condition? One sometimes wonders
after being passed on the highway by a rolling junk pile being
driven twice as fast as it should be.
In general, the courts have been rather lenient in permitting
defendants to use the defense of unavoidable accident in suits where
some malfunction of the defendant's car caused the collision.
In Otto v. Sellnow, 25 the court held that an accident occasioned
by a tire blowout was an unavoidable accident and therefore there
was no liability on the part of the owner or operator. In this case,
the evidence showed that there was at least 1,300 pounds of passen-
gers and equipment in the car at the time of the accident. Though
such a load could not fairly be considered excessive, what con-
clusion should the court have reached had the load been twice or
three times that figure? Should not the court attempt, as in Otto, to
determine if the defendant's tires were known to be faulty or de-
fective? It would be illogical indeed to cite this case as standing for
the proposition that if one has a blowout, he may always plead un-
avoidable accident, and automatically be relieved of any liability.
The Restatement of Torts26 again provides a logical guide for such
instances. To stay in strict accordance with the definitions of un-
avoidable accident, it would seem that the defendant in such a case
should first have the burden of proving that he was not negligent.
Only when the defendant successfully proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that he has not been negligent, should the court
permit an instruction upon unavoidable accident.
Oklahoma Power & Water Co. v. Howell27 involved an unusual
situation. One of the defendant's trucks was on one shoulder of
the highway using a winch line to pull another truck stuck in the
ditch on the opposite side. When the plaintiff attempted to make an
emergency stop upon approaching the defendant's trucks, he dis-
covered that the brakes on his truck were inoperative because the
rear axle of his truck had broken without his knowledge. The plain-
tiff was helpless as he rolled headlong down a steep slope and
smashed into the taut winch line stretched across the highway. De-
spite the appearance of a prima facie case of negligence, the jury
found neither party to be negligent. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
approved the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident.
24 Id. § 307, comment c.
25 233 Minn. 215, 46 N.W.2d 641 (1951).
26 Restatement, Torts 1 307, comment c (1934).
27 201 Okla. 615, 207 P.2d 937 (1949).
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Could not questions similar to those raised above be posed in such
an instance as this?
In the Howell case, the court held that the defendant power
company was not required to anticipate such an accident, since they
could reasonably expect that an approaching vehicle would have
ample opportunity to size up the situation correctly and come to
a safe stop. Evidence showed that the plaintiff had been able to
see the trucks some 3,000 feet away. Yet this distance would give
the driver of a car who was driving sixty miles per hour only
thirty-four seconds to determine that the hazard existed and come
to a safe stop. Driving safety literature shows that at sixty miles
per hour on a dry highway, an ordinary driver requires 66 feet for
'reaction time' and 296 feet for braking distance, or a total of 362 feet
in which to stop.2 8 Subtracting this distance from the 3,000 feet
in the Howell case leaves 2,638 feet, or only thirty seconds to de-
termine that a hazard exists before beginning to apply the brakes.
This time would be shortened considerably in a case such as this,
however, because it is questionable that one could see a cable across
the road at a distance of more than a few hundred feet. Obviously
it would be necessary to detect such a cable before one could even
realize the existence of the hazard. It is also anomalous that one
could drive a truck without knowing that the rear axle was broken.
Yet, these questions went unasked and unanswered.
In other cases, it has been held an unavoidable accident when a
shackle bolt on the front springs broke, throwing the car out of
control and into another car,29 and also when the breaking of a
truck's rear axle left the truck astraddle of railroad tracks a short
time before a speeding train struck it.3"
In Alward v. Paola,3 1 the defendant's car went out of control
on a steep downhill slope of a winding three-lane highway when the
car's brakes apparently failed. After a wild ride, around many
curves, the defendant struck the rear of one car and careened head-
on into the plaintiff's approaching car. Conflicting evidence was pre-
sented in which the defendant swore that her brake pressure had
been entirely gone. Plaintiff's witnesses and the investigating of-
ficers, however, testified to seeing long skid marks which could have
been made only by the defendant's car. Others testified that the de-
fendant's brakes were found to be satisfactory immediately after
the accident and also in the repair garage. Defense testimony was
given by expert mechanics who offered a plausible and valid reason
why one's brakes could fail for a short time and then be restored.
The court held that instructions on sudden peril and unavoidable
accident were appropriate if substantiated by the evidence, and that
since it could be said that there was evidence to sustain the jury's
finding that the defendant was not negligent, the judgment for the
defendant must be affirmed.32
28 American Auto. Assoc., Minimum Stopping Distances Chart (1957).
29 Seele v. Purcell, 45 N.M. 176, 113 P.2d 320 (1941).
30 Union Pac. R.R. v. Shupe, 131 Colo. 271, 280 P.2d 1115 (1955).
31 79 Cal. App. 2d 1, 179 P,2d 5 (Ct. App. 1947).
32 Cf. Merry v. Knudsen Creamery, 94 Cal. App. 2d 715, 211 P.2d 905 (1949) (instruction on
unavoidable accident proper where defendant claimed brakes failed despite testimony that brakes
had been inspected and adjusted day before accident).
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Ridley v. Young,38 a fairly recent Colorado case, presents a
difficult question concerning unavoidable accident. It is difficult to
reconcile the holding in this case with the stand taken in the Re-
statement of Torts.3 4 The plaintiff was riding with the defendant
in the defendant's car. Conflicting evidence was presented as to who
was driving at the time of the accident, but the car was being
driven at a high rate of speed despite the defendant's knowledge
that his brakes were not correctly adjusted and were prone to lock.
While travelling at a high rate of speed, the car overturned, and
the plaintiff was injured. Conflicting testimony was given con-
cerning whether the accident was caused by the locking of a
front wheel brake or by a tire blowout. Upon appeal from a
judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff alleged it was erroneous
for the trial court to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident.
The supreme court approved the giving of the instruction since it
was felt that there were logical inferences which might have been
drawn from the evidence to the effect that the accident was caused
by conditions over which the driver had no control, and of which
he had no knowledge.
Broken steering mechanisms are often causes of collisions.
Generally, the courts will consider such a mishap to be an unavoid-
abie accident. This is understandable, particularly because of the
suddenness with which such a mishap occurs. Typical of such acci-
dents are those described in Iacino v. Brown,35 Doggett v. Lacey,36
and White v. Ackers.3 7 In these cases, the courts held that the de-
fendants were victims of unavoidable accidents and therefore not
liable. A different result was reached, however, in Humphries v.
Gray,38 The steering mechanism of the defendant's car suddenly
broke as she approached the plaintiff on a gravelled road. The
breaking of the steering mechanism drag link was attributed to the
shock encountered when the defendant's car struck a small pile of
gravel in the road just before the collision. The evidence, however,
tended to show that the defendant was driving too fast for the
condition of the road. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident, and held that any
damage to the steering mechanism was due to the defendant's negli-
gence in driving faster than warranted by the condition of the
road.
The stand taken by the Restatement of Torts39 is illustrated by
the opinion in a recent California case40 where the defendant's
brakes failed and he was so frightened that he forgot to use his
emergency brake. The defendant's car was six years old, but his
33 127 Colo. 40, 2-3 e ?d 433 (1953).
34 Restatement, Torts 9 307, comment c (1934).
35 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950).
36 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1932).
37 125 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
38 305 Ky. 206, 203 S.W.2d 8 (1947).
39 Restatement, Torts §§ 289, 298, 302, and 307 (1934).
40Alarid v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd 50 Col. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897
1958) (two justices dissenting).
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brakes had been inspected within the prior two months. The court,
in approving an instruction upon unavoidable accident, said:
"In the driving of automobiles such brake failures are
not unknown and they frequently come suddenly, without
any warning. The average driver is not a mechanical ex-
pert, and is not necessarily in a position to anticipate such a
mechanical failure. The essential question in such a case
is not as to exactly what caused the mechanical failure but
is as to whether he had or should have had some prior
knowledge of facts which should have led him to take proper
steps in advance which might have prevented the brake
failure."
4 1
Interesting conjectures arise when one considers the manda-
tory motor vehicle safety inspections which are now required by
many states. Do these inspections relieve the owner of an automo-
bile from legal responsibility for inspecting his car between these
periodic inspections required by the state? Is liability removed
when such an owner is involved in a collision resulting from faulty
brakes only a short time after one of these safety inspections?
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT AND DRIVER ERROR
It is unquestionable that the vast majority of automobile col-
lisions are attributable in some way to human error and poor judg-
ment. Everyone who drives a car at one time or another has en-
countered, for example, drivers who delight in pulling in and out
of traffic like a broken-field runner in a football game. The list of
the other types of such "damn fool" drivers is long. Yet, in many
instances, defendants who are in court because of collisions result-
ing from driver error and poor judgment will plead unavoidable
accident. It is indeed fortunate that the courts have rarely permit-
ted such pleas to be accepted.
Arrendell v. Wells 42 was one of the rare cases in which the
court accepted the plea. The plaintiff's son was killed in a head-on
collision which happened when the defendant suddenly swerved
onto the opposite side of the highway so that he could turn left onto
an intersecting road. The court approved the giving of an instruc-
tion upon unavoidable accident to the jury. Nevertheless, the jury
still found that such a mishap was not unavoidable, and found the
defendant guilty of negligence, which was affirmed by the appellate
court. A similar situation is found in Price v. Leon.
43
These two cases are definitely minority viewpoints and it is
obvious that the courts are becoming even tougher where a collision
is caused by such negligence. As pointed out in many cases, it is
error to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident where it is
apparent that nothing obstructed the view of the drivers, the con-
dition of the highway was not to blame, and no mechanical failure
or other intervening cause occurred.44 Typical of situations where
41317 P.2d at 112.
42 149 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
43 202 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1959
the courts have refused to instruct on unavoidable accident is Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Darden.45 Here the plaintiff's car was struck
by a street car as the plaintiff pulled out of a parking space. Mr.
Justice Leddy said:
"It would be going too far to say that, when a street car
and an automobile are operated upon a street, under such
conditions as are here shown, a collision could not be
avoided by due and proper care upon the part of both
parties. To so hold would be in effect to declare that in all
cases where a collision occurs between a street car and an
automobile the issue of unavoidable accident is necessarily
presented.
'46
In Menefee v. State,47 the defendant in a criminal prosecution
pleaded that it was an unavoidable accident when he struck a
child after he passed a school bus that was unloading passengers.
The court held that it was not an unavoidable accident since the
mishap would have been avoided had the defendant complied with
the state statute48 which made it mandatory for motorists to stop
when encountering a school bus loading or unloading passengers.
The stiffer attitude which has been taken by the courts in re-
cent years is demonstrated in Harrison v. King.49 The defendant,
while driving at high speed, passed and sideswiped the plaintiff's
truck. The defendant, in pleading unavoidable accident, alleged that
as she began to pull around the truck, the left front wheel of her
car went off the opposite edge of the highway, thereby causing her
to lose control of her car. The court held that the collision was the
result of her negligence, and, therefore, was not an unavoidable
accident. The court's stand was perhaps influenced by the disclosure
that the defendant had straightened her wheels and continued
abreast of the defendant for some time before finally colliding.
Carr v. Boyd 50 points out that Colorado has also taken a stern
attitude where the facts do not indicate that the mishap was an un-
avoidable accident. The defendant became impatient when she
found herself behind a slow line of highway traffic. Upon pulling
out of line in an attempt to pass several cars, she found herself
trapped when the gap in the traffic closed up. Unable to pull back
into line, she collided head on with the plaintiff's approaching car.
Mr. Justice Holland, speaking for the court, concluded that there
44 E.g., McCarthy Oil & Gas Corp. v. Cunningham, 255 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Chesshir
v. Nail, 218 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Collins v. Smith, 175 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Johnson v. Hodges, 121 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Younger Bros., Inc. v. Power, 118 S.W.2d
954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
45 38 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931). C.f. Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 520, 213
P.2d 404 (1950) (defendant while speeding struck plaintiff's car when plaintiff slowed to make left
turn); Kaley v. Huntley, 88 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935) (plaintiff while passenger in defendant's
car was injured in collision which happened when defendant-driver turned head to talk to passenger
in rear seat); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935); Brewer v. Berner, 15 Wash. 2d 644, 131 P.2d 940 (1942).
46 Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Darden, supra note 45 at 779.
47 87 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935).
48 Tex. Penal Code §§ 301b(!)-(2) (Vernon 1931).
49 296 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
50 123 Colo. 350, 229 P.2d 659 (1951); cf. Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 240 P.2d 822 (1952)
(reversible error to give instruction on unavoidable accident where collision at intersection was such
an occurence as could have been avoided by exercise of due care); Gall v. Fowler, 124 Colo. 404, 238
P.2d 187 (1951) (no issue warranting submission of instruction on unavoidable accident where plain-
tiff on motor scooter struck defendant's car as defendant made unlawful U-turn).
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was no issue of unavoidable accident raised where the collision was
the result of the defendant using such poor judgment as to place
herself in a hazardous position from which she could not extricate
herself.
The stand taken by the Colorado Supreme Court in Carr v. Boyd
is unquestionably supported by the Restatement of Torts:51
"The actor should recognize that his conduct involves
a risk of causing an invasion of another's interest, if a per-
son,
(a) possessing such perception of the surrounding cir-
cumstances as a reasonable man would have . . .
would infer that the act creates an appreciable
chance of causing such invasion."
In line with the policies of most states as reflected in statutes
concerned with driver financial responsibility,52 compulsory driver's
license examinations, 53 and procedure to revoke or suspend the
license of any habitually reckless driver,54 it would seem that the
courts should maintain their present stern attitude against those
drivers who are "an accident going some place to happen."
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND THE SUDDEN STOP
The number of rear-end collisions which one hears about is
some indication of the frequent occurrence of this type of collision.
A recent law review article points out the frequency of this type
of collision, and vividly illustrates one type of the more serious
injuries which may result from such collisions.5  As may well be
expected, many defendants have alleged unavoidable accident after
a grinding rear-end smashup. The courts, however, have been rather
reluctant to permit the raising of the defense of unavoidable acci-
dent. The courts are strongly reinforced in this position by statutes
requiring drivers to maintain proper intervals between moving
vehicles. 56
In Town & Country Securities Co. v. Place,57 the plaintiff
was waiting at a red light when his car was struck from the rear.
The defendant testified that when his foot slipped off the brake
pedal his car had rolled forward only three feet before striking the
plaintiff's car. Despite a plea of unavoidable accident, the court
affirmed the trial court's action in refusing to instruct the jury
upon unavoidable accident. Similarly, the court in Leeper v. Nel-
son58 refused to reverse a judgment for the plaintiff where it was
51 Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934).
52 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-7-1 through 13-7-39 (1953).
53 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-3-10 (Supp. 1956).
54 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. I 13-3-24(c) (Supp. 1956).
55 Zarlengo, Whiplash Injuries, 36 DICTA 285 (1959).
56 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-45 (1953) (driver shall not follow more closely than reasonable
with regard to speed, traffic, and condition of highway).
57 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165 (1955). But see Davis v. Ewen, 148 Cal. App. 2d 410, 306 P.2d
908 (1957) (not error to give instruction on unavoidable accident even though one might well have
anticipated a sudden stop); Kuykendall v. Doose, 260 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
58,139 Cal. App. 2d 65, 293 P.2d 111 (1956). But see Hooper v. Bronson, 123 Cal. App. 2d 243,
266 P.2d 590 (1954) (intersection crash while plaintiff waiting for traffic to pass before turning).
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shown that the defendant had struck the plaintiff's car as the
plaintiff was waiting at an intersection to make a left turn. The
defendant had averred that the collision was an unavoidable acci-
dent because the "Go" signal arm was up. The court rejected the
defense when it was shown, however, that the lights themselves
were working properly.
Conversely, the courts in certain instances have permitted the
defendant to plead unavoidable accident in rear-end collision cases.
A typical instance when the defense of unavoidable accident would
be valid is found in a California case where the defendant's brakes
failed. The defense was thought to be valid in the light of evidence
that the brakes on the defendant's truck had been inspected and
adjusted the preceding evening.5 9
Rear-end collisions while both vehicles are moving are fairly
common also. The defense of unavoidable accident was permitted in
Lynch v. Defino6,5 0 where the plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman,
was injured when his motorcycle skidded and overturned. The
plaintiff had swerved to avoid the defendant's car as it turned left
at an intersection. The court held that an instruction upon unavoid-
able accident was proper when it was shown that the plaintiff did
not sound his siren until just before entering the intersection.
Moving rear-end collisions, generally, result in the defendant
being found guilty of negligance. Courts have refused to permit
the defense of unavoidable accident where it was shown that the
plaintiff, who slowed down to let an approaching car clear a nar-
row bridge before he himself entered it, was not so close in front
of the defendant as to prevent the defendant from stopping safely.6 1
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND POOR VISIBILITY
It is only reasonable to believe that the prudent driver should
be required to slow down, if possible to do so safely, when he is
unable to see where he is going. Yet this is not always the case.
Many exceptions have been made in various circumstances. There
is a multiplicity of cases concerning a collision where one or both
of the drivers has been blinded by such things as bright lights, fog,
smoke, dust, snow, or obstructions.
An excellent annotation 62 on the rule requiring a blinded driver
to stop, summarizes the prevailing view thusly:
"(Practical) considerations have caused considerable
dissatisfaction with the rule requiring the blinded motorist
to stop, and while some courts continue to apply it with con-
59 Merry v. Knudsen Creamery, 94 Cal. App. 2d 715, 211 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1949); accord, Alarid
v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958) (defendant's
brakes failed although they had been inspected within two months).
60 114 Cal. App. 2d 128, 249 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1952).
61 Kelly v. Employers Cas. Co. 202 Okla. 437, 214 P.2d 925 (1950); cf. Schmid v. Eslick, 181
Kan. 997, 317 P.2d 459 (1957)( defendant pulled onto highway in front of plaintiff and was struck
before he could get up speed).
62 Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 298-99 (1952). (Footnotes omitted.)
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siderable strictness, others have rejected it for the rule that
the duty of a motorist so blinded is determinable by the
standard of the ordinary care exercised by a reasonably pru-
dent person under the same circumstances . . . [0] thers,
while recognizing the rule as generally controlling, have
held that it must be applied in the light of the particular
circumstances prevailing at the time . . (The rule) is
subject to a number of exceptions and qualifications, de-
pending upon such factors as traffic conditions, such as
whether the blinded motorist was closely followed by an-
other car, the nature and visibility of the object obstructing
the road, and the suddenness of the blinding.
'63
Weather conditions represent a goodly portion of the "blinded
driver" cases. In Vizzini v. Dopkin,6 4 the court rejected the de-
fendant's stand that it was an unavoidable accident when he struck
63 For an excellent discussion of the "blinding lights" rule, see comment,The Range of Vision &
Blinding Lights Rules in Automobile Accident Cases, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 498 (1935). Compare Dixie
Ohio Express Co. v. Vickery, 306 Ky. 171, 206 S.W.2d 821 (1947) (collision on overpass when parties
blinded by smoke from train passing below; parties had duty to exercise ordinary care and when
blinded should stop).












a pedestrian at an intersection. The defendant's plea was refused
despite evidence showing that the defendant's vision had been im-
paired by sleet and freezing rain. The court held that it was no
excuse that the poor weather conditions had reduced the defend-
ant's vision and that such conditions should instead serve to make
him more vigilant and subject him to a greater degree of respon-
sibility.6 5 Other cases6" have held that in the absence of any evidence
tending to show that the accident was due to other reasons, it is
proper to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident when a
driver's limited vision was the proximate cause of the mishap.
Biladeau v. Pomerenke 7 presents a unique set of circumstances.
The plaintiff's car was forced into a roadside snow bank by another
car which left the scene without stopping. While the plaintiff was
extricating himself from the snow bank, and his car was diagonally
across the road, a nearby snow-removal machine, which had been
stopped, started down the road. The resulting snow cloud blinded
the approaching defendant truck driver so that he was unable to
see the plaintiff's car until too late to avoid the collision. The court
held that it was proper to instruct upon unavoidable accident, and
that the defendant had not had a duty to slow down when he came
to the snow cloud since it was a moving cloud and was only tem-
porary in nature.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Jacobsen v. McGinness,6
followed reasoning similar to that used in Parker v. Womack,"9
which was discussed above. In Jacobsen, the plaintiff was travelling
down a gravel road when an oil transport truck approached and
passed him. The passing truck created a large dust cloud which blew
across the road toward the plaintiff's side. While the dust was still
thick, one of the defendants, who was travelling behind the trans-
port truck and in the midst of the dust, suddenly swerved to the
left and collided head on with the plaintiff. A third car, driven by
a co-defendant, was so close behind the plaintiff that it too smashed
into the plaintiffs car.
No reason was given for the defendant's sudden move into the
plaintiff's path. The plaintiff appealed an adverse decision from the
trial court, charging that it was a prejudicial error for that court
to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident. The supreme court
held that it was prima facie evidence of the defendant's negligence
65 Cf. McBride v. Woods, 124 Colo. 384, 238 P.2d 183 (1951) (driver backed into pedestrian in
cross-walk; not unavoidable accident); Ramsey v. Sharpley, 294 Ky. 286, 171 S.W.2d 427 (1943)
(defendant hit jaywalker; not unavoidable accident since driver obligated to give timely warning of
approach of vehicle); Red Arrow Freight Lines v. Smith, 93 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (truck
hit child in school zone when child darted in front of truck; not unavoidable occident since driver
failed to use ordinary care upon seeing school zone signs). But cf., Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d
361, 191 P.2d 25 (Ct. App. 1948) (truck backed into child while unloading dirt on school yard; un-
avoidable accident since driver was using due care under circumstances that children were supervised
and had been repeatedly warned of hazard); Lofland v. Jackson, 237 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(unavoidable accident when driver suddenly blinded by sun and struck pedestrian walking in shadows).
66 Hinkle v. Union Transfer Co., 229 F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1955) (unavoidable accident where driver
unable to see stopped truck alongside road because of bright headlights and blinding rain); Maloney
v. Jussel, 125 Colo. 125, 241 P.2d 862 (1952) (sleet and ice on windshield) (reversed on other
grounds); Rainey v. McMillian, 271 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (rain); Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
Delahoussaye, 124 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (raining and windows fogged).
67 33 Wash. 2d 145, 204 P.2d 518 (1949).
68 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957).
69 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951).
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that her car was on the wrong side of the road. The court felt that
the instruction on unavoidable accident tended to divert the minds
of the jurors from .tht':dci ive issues of negligence and contributory
negligence, and agreed with the plaintiff that the instruction sug-
gested that the defendants might be held blameless for reasons
other than their freedom from negligence. In reversing and directing
that a new trial be had on the issue of damages only, the court held
that the facts amply demonstrated that the accident was not un-
avoidable. The court concluded by saying that it required no ex-
ceptional skill, foresight, or care on the part of the defendant to stay
on her side of the road.
The decision in Jacobsen represents an excellent and reasonable
reconciliation of the majority and minority views set forth in Parker
v. Womack. Such a mishap most certainly should be considered as
being proximately caused by an action considered negligent as a
matter of law, and, therefore, not subject to being denoted as un-
avoidable. Where such a course is followed, there is little doubt that
the rights of both parties will be equally protected. 70
Other cases involving collisions where a driver was blinded by
dust have used similar approaches to reach a decision. It was held
that an instruction on unavoidable accident was properly refused
where the plaintiff's vision was restricted by a cloud of dust cre-
ated by the defendant as he pulled onto the highway in front of the
plaintiff.7 1 It was proper, however, to instruct on unavoidable acci-
dent where the collision with the plaintiff happened when the de-
fendant's vision was cut off by a cloud of dust which the defendant
created in pulling off the highway to avoid a collision with the third
car. The instruction was approved because the court felt that the
question of determination should be left to the jury since a third
person was instrumental in causing the mishap.
72
The requirement of due care, as might be expected, is followed
in those cases involving an intersection collision where the vision
of one or both drivers was obstructed. 73 The driver, if exercising due
care, is blameless, if the jury finds that he could not have reasonably
expected to anticipate the collision.
74
Two unique cases arose when the defendant in each case failed
to see a poorly-lighted slow-moving vehicle on the highway and
smashed into the rear of the slower vehicle. In one of these cases, 5
it was held proper to submit an instruction upon unavoidable acci-
dent when it was shown that the plaintiff's horse-drawn wagon
was lawfully on the highway and had complied with the statutory
requirements dealing with rear reflectors. It was also considered to
be an unavoidable accident where the defendant struck the rear of
a potato digger being towed behind the plaintiff's tractor at night.
70 See discussion and cases cited in notes 15 and 16, supra.
71Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1931). Compare Winn v. Taylor, 111
S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (defendant lost his direction in a dust cloud raised by passing
truck and collided with second truck following first truck; instruction was proper).
72 Webb v. Hardin, 53 Ariz. 310, 89 P.2d 30 (1939).
73 E.g., Hodgson v. Paul, 16 N.J. Super. 87, 83 A.2d 783 (App. Div. 1951); Stovall v. Whatley,
183 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
74 Flemings' Fraternal Undertaking Co. v. Quarrells, 116 S.W.2d 1160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
75 Valley Film Service v. Cruz, 173 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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Neither the tractor nor the digger was equipped with reflectors or
tail lights, and only a small spotlight was showing from the rear
of the tractor. The court concluded that the potato digger was not
a "motor vehicle" within the scope of the statutory requirements
that motor vehicles must be equipped with tail lights and reflec-
tors.7
6
THE UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, SKIDS, AND
THE DOCTRINE OF SUDDEN PERIL
Approved definitions of an unavoidable accident frequently in-
clude skidding as one of the factors which may properly raise a
question of unavoidable accident. 77 As might be expected, there is
a tremendous number of cases involving skidding. Only a few of
'the more typical and some unusual cases are discussed here to illus-
trate the usual determinations.
7
Stephens v. Lung79 typifies the viewpoint in Colorado. The
defendant began to skid when he was forced to swerve to avoid
striking another car which pulled in front of him. The defendant's
skid left him powerless to avoid sliding headon into the plaintiff's
approaching car. The court held that the mishap was unavoidable.
Similar holdings have been made in Maloney v. Jusse8 0 and in
cases in other jurisdictions."1 However, the requirement of due care
must still be met. Where it is apparent to a reasonable and prudent
driver that the road is hazardous, he must exercise greater caution.
Under such circumstances, if a mishap does happen, the defendant
may not successfully plead unavoidable accident unless it is shown
that he has exercised the care which a prudent driver would use
under those conditions.
8 2
The Restatement of Torts8 3 states the well established doctrine
of sudden peril thusly:
"In determining whether conduct is negligent toward
another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden
emergency not caused by his own tortious conduct which
requires rapid decision is a factor in determining the rea-
sonable character of his choice of action."
As might be expected, the doctrine of sudden peril is appli-
cable to situations in which the issue of unavoidable accident may
be involved. In accordance with the sudden peril doctrine, the
measure of what a reasonable and prudent driver would be ex-
pected to do depends upon the circumstances of the case.
76 Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P.2d 608 (1955) (digger was "implement of husbandry").
But rf. Comment, 35 DICTA 203 (1958).
77 E.g., Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 249 P.2d 822 (1952); Vergouwen v. Parsons, 294 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Chesshir v. Nail, 218 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Winn v Taylor,
111 S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
78 See I Part 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 635 (perm. ed. 1957)
for cases involvinq skidding.
79 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
80 125 Colo. 125, 241 P.2d 862 (1952).
81 E.g., Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v. Fields, 140 Tex. 221, 166 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1942); Blasberg v. Cockrell, 254 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Blanton v. E. & L. Transp. Co,
203 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
82 Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957); accord, Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934).
83 Restatement, Torts 1 296 (1934).
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In general, the courts have been generous in permitting in-
structions on unavoidable accident in situations which ordinarily, if
not for an emergency, would tend to show negligence by one or
both parties. For example, it is usually considered prima facie evi-
dence of negligence for a driver to be on the wrong side of the
highway.8 4 Despite this burden of overcoming such prima facie evi-
dence, defendants have often invoked the doctrine of sudden peril,
and have been permitted to plead unavoidable accident.8 5 The
courts, however, will not permit an instruction on unavoidable
accident where the defendant makes an invalid claim of sudden
peril. Typical of this position is Fogle v. Phillips, 6 where the de-
fendent collided head on with the plaintiff just after topping a hill.
The defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed
upon unavoidable accident since he had been forced to swing over
onto the far side of the road to avoid some pedestrians on the oppo-
site side of the hill. The court refused the defendant's claim of sudden
peril when it was shown that the defendant had been going only
twenty-five miles per hour and that the pedestrians had been about
one hundred feet from the top of the hill. The court concluded that
the defendant had had sufficient time in which to return to his
right side of the road and thereby avoid the collision.
The congestion of modern highways and streets, and the speed
at which automobiles normally operate, make it difficult to apply
any hard and fast rules. Strict application of rules is being tem-
pered with common sense in order to reach a balance with the
prevalent desires of the public to reach their destination in a hurry.
Automobile law is perhaps one of the fastest changing phases of
modern law. Although basic principles of law must remain un-
changed, it will be necessary for the modern judicial system to
apply these rules so that justice and equity will still be reached.
84 E.g., Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957).
85 E.g., Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal. App. 2d 441, 36 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1934) (driver swerved
to avoid child who darted into street); Tate v. Collins, 266 Ky. 322, 98 S.W.2d 938 (1936) (driver
swerved to avoid child who darted into street); Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P.2d 671 (1951)
(vehicle parked on highway required driver to swerve away resulting in collision with approaching
vehicle); Swift & Co. v. Eanes, 92 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (vehicle parked on highway
required driver to swerve away resulting in collision with approaching vehicle).
86 191 Md. 114, 60 A.2d 198 (1948).
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ALCOHOLISM - A LEGAL PROBLEM?
By ALBERT B. LOGAN
Historically, the lawyer has had the responsibility of public
leadership assigned to him by his fellow-citizens; and, historically,
he has discharged that responsibility in such a creditable manner
that society has learned to depend upon him, especially in matters
of law and government. But the lawyer has scrupuously confined
his activities to problems of a legal nature. Hence, it would not be
strange if he felt some reticence about having his bar association
venture into such a different new field as alcoholism.
The lawyer's first reaction is to suggest that alcoholism is a
social problem-or a medical problem-surely anything but a legal
problem! True, all lawyers have unavoidably had some contact with
the alcoholic. He was a defendant in a divorce case, a drunk driver,
a short check artist, the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, etc.
Generally, he presented unpleasant problems, and was seldom a
good paying client. By and large, the medical profession has also
preferred to regard the alcoholic as an undesirable patient, both
from the standpoint of prognosis and payment.
But, whether he liked it or not, the lawyer has recently found
the problem of alcoholism dropped into his lap as the result of
these developments:
1. Alcoholism was recognized by the medical profession as a
treatable disease. (The Colorado Medical Society in 1958 formally
recognized the alcoholic as a sick person and announced that the
illness can be arrested by treatment. Prior to this, the American
Medical Association and the American Hospital Association had
done the same.)
2. Colorado, with 40,000 alcoholic citizens, is faced with a mam-
moth public health problem, and a tremendous public responsibility.
But neither the state nor its legal subdivisions provides a single
clinic, treatment center or other facility devoted to modern-day
treatment of alcoholism-nor do we have the legal machinery to
permit the treatment.
3. The courts have begun to realize that they are confronted
with a major problem of administering for these sick people, involv-
ing diagnosis, medication, confinement and treatment-with only
the patently inadequate tools of the night stick and the jail. The
courts knew from bitter experience that incarceration is no deter-
rent, to drunkenness.
4. The Colorado Bar Association was requested and urged to
step into the breach and provide the legal guidance to permit the
people of this state to attack a major. health and social problem
that was threatening disaster and protracted misery to a substantial
segment of our citizenry.
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Consequently, in April of 1958 a Committee on Alcoholism was
named by President William W. Gaunt of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion. The new Committee worked with its counterpart in the Colo-
rado Medical Society and set out on an intensive study of the prob-
lem and its legal aspects. Many questions required answers, and
some startling conclusions were reached.
What is alcoholism? It is defined as the illness which causes a
person to persist in drinking alcoholic beverages in spite of the fact
that such drinking seriously impairs the social, economic or physical
welfare of himself or others. There is no actual relationship between
the amount of intoxicants consumed and the existence of alcoholism.
Drunkenness does not necessarily indicate alcoholism. Less than
10% of the known alcoholic population (some studies show 1 2%)
is found on skid row.
The economic impact of alcoholism in this country is estimated
to cost over a billion dollars each year. Industry's share through
worker inefficiency, reduction of productivity and carelessness
accounts for about half of this. More than 20 million dollars is spent
by public agencies for the families of problem drinkers, and private
agencies to spend a like amount for the same purpose. Accidents due
to the excessive use of alcohol probably cost 125 million dollars
each year. The annual cost of care for alcoholics in mental hospitals
is 30 million dollars with our penal institutions spending another
25 million dollars for the care of the alcoholic prisoners. An even
COLORADO uses both!
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greater loss, too staggering even to be guessed at, lies in broken
homes, frustrated children, unhappy parents, wives and husbands.
The City and County of Denver spends $1,300,000 annually
for the arrest, trial and incarceration of such people-with no record
of any rehabilitation or arrest of the disease---and endless "revolving
door" perpetuating the misery and useless lives of a great number
of homeless men and women.
When the doctors and hospitals finally decided to undertake
treatment of this very sick segment of our community, they found
that to a very substantial degree they were stymied by an archaic
legal system. In Colorado the law treats this type of invalid as a
criminal or a lunatic, or as a gutter bum to be removed as speedily
as possible from public view. Doctors found that this attitude pre-
vents motivation of the sick alcoholic to seek help, and made their
attempts at treatment or rehabilitation utterly ineffective.
Therefore, the first order of business was to modernize the legal
machinery to permit modern medical and psychiatric techniques to
function. The Committee on Alcoholism was continued under the
administration of President Douglas McHendrie. 1 An intensive
study program was undertaken both as to the nature of
the baffling program and as to its legal ramifications. Statutes
of other states and nations were studied, clinical surveys
and reports of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies were analyzed,
and the opinions of medical, social and governmental authorities
were reviewed.
The Committee recognizes that the final solution of the devas-
tating cancer of alcoholism in our social anatomy cannot come until
public attitudes change from degrading the alcoholic as a social
villain to understanding him as a sick person in need of treatment.
(Remember the stigma associated with tuberculosis fifty years
ago and with venereal disease twenty years ago?) It is not the
function of the Bar Association to provide this public education.
But some progress will come when lawyers, judges and legislators
acquire the knowledge and understanding necessary to fulfill their
responsibility of leadership.
However, the Committee's studies have led to the inescapable
conclusion that, from the standpoint of modern legal and treatment
approaches, Colorado is one of the most backward states in the
nation. Colorado law provides for a Commission on Alcoholism. But
the Legislature has hamstrung it by voting only token funds. It is
estimated that Colorado now expends $9.5 millions of public funds
annually attributable to alcoholism-but very little is done at the
public level toward rehabilitation or treatment.
! The Committee is now composed of Albert B. Logan, chairman, Judge Mitchel Johns, Judge
Joseph E. Cook, Judge Jean J. Jacobuci, Judge William H. Burnett, Eugene A. Frantz, Leonard V.
Carlin, J. Corder Smith, C. Fred Barnard, R. Franklin McKelvey, Richard H. Beresford, Bently M.
McMullin, Whitford Myers, Sol Cohen and Baxter Ireland.
SACHS-LHLLOR- CORPORAITIOn SEALS- ILPInE 5-3422
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Subject to continuing study, the Committee has reached the
following conclusions:
1. Alcoholism is an incurable illness, but it can be
arrested in some individuals by modern methods of treat-
ment and rehabilitation, permitting physical recovery, psy-
chological and emotional therapy and spiritual develop-
ment.
2. Alcoholism is a major public health problem, and,
hence, a public responsibility.
3. Colorado's present methods of arrest, trial and in-
carceration are archaic and ineffective, tending to aggra-
vate the problem, rather than to alleviate it.
4. Colorado's present court handling of alcoholics re-
sults in an almost complete loss of vast sums of public
money, without making a dent in the alcoholic problem. If
modern methods of treatment and rehabilitation were
adopted, the public cost might be considerably less.
5. Deprivation of freedom has no lasting deterrent
effect on alcoholics.
6. Changes in Colorado commitment procedures are
urgently needed and would prove beneficial.
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7. Progress by medical and social agencies is now
wholly dependent upon changes in the legal machinery
related to this problem. Our clients, the people of Colo-
rado, are looking to their lawyers, acting through the Colo-
rado Bar Association, for guidance and leadership in a grave
public crisis. It is a challenge that we cannot leave un-
answered.
With the assistance of the Colorado Medical Society and other
qualified agencies, and after a careful study of statutes of other
states, the Committee prepared a bill for Voluntary and Involun-
tary Hospitalization of Alcoholics-the first big step in Colorado
toward removal of archaic legal barriers. The Board of Governors
approved. The Senate passed it, but it was sidetracked in the House
Rules Committee late in the last session. The Governor has indi-
cated it will be in his call for the next session. Failure of the General
Assembly to adopt this bill, which would have permitted the alco-
holic to retain his rights of citizenship and obtain treatment on a
voluntary basis, has retarded progress for another year.
The Committee attacked the facet of alcoholism most apparent
in the public mind-processing the alcoholic defendant at the mu-
nicipal court level. The Rocky Mountain Conference of Municipal
Judges-the first such meeting ever held in the United States to
concentrate on this question-was scheduled in Colorado Springs for
October 13 and 14, 1959. Financed by a Technical Assistance Project
tract from the U. S. Public Health Services, it brought speakers
of national prominence to discuss the problems in a workshop with
judges from Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Nebraska,
Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa and California. The conference was
co-sponsored by Colorado College, Colorado Bar Association, Colo-
rado Medical Society, Colorado Commission on Alcoholism, Colo-
rado Department of Public Health and National Institute of Mental
Health. The findings and conclusions of that conference are said
to have a national impact. They may be the basis for an all-out drive
on the part of the American Bar Association.
Correlated with that conference was the session at the annual
convention of the Colorado Bar Association-its first seminar on
alcoholism. Speakers included Hon. John M. Murtagh, Presiding
Judge, Magistrates Courts, City of New York; Marvin A. Block,
M.D., Buffalo, New York, chairman of the Committee on Alcohol-
ism, American Medical Association; Hon. Joseph D. Lohman, Chi-
cago, Ill., former sheriff of Cook County and now Illinois State
Treasurer; and Hon. Ray Harrison, Judge of the Municipal Court,
Des Moines, Iowa.
Other activities of the Colorado Bar Committee include:
1. Publication of a Committee Manual for use of local
bar associations and American Bar Association.
2. Study and recommendation of legal improvements in




3. Study of legal means to reduce tbe staggering cost of
alcoholism to the state and municipalities.
4. Study of legal requirements to step-up education
about alcoholism, particularly at the teacher level.
That there is an urgent need for constructive legal planning
to cope with this baffling and growing problem of social devasta-
tion, is dramatically illustrated in the urgent plea of Denver Mu-
nicipal Judge Gerald E. McAuliffe, who states:
"It is a sickening and frustrating, and even frightening,
experience for a sincere and conscientious judge to sit day
after day in judgment of these human derelicts without
having available tools and techniques to meet the responsi-
bilities . ..In short, I feel that there must be a realistic
approach and modern study carried out impartially and on
a systematic basis to uncover all the myriad facets of infor-
mation and data involved which may have any bearing
whatever, no matter how slight, on this major problem
and which will contribute to its ultimate solution. If that is
done, then I reiterate... that such an accumulation of data
and information from the foregoing sources will shock the
public consciousness!"
Studies of the bar committee to date bear out this prediction.
And the committee received other sound counsel from no less an
authority in this field than Hon. John M. Murtagh, Chief City
Magistrate, New York City, who states:
"There is no moral basis for using a penal approach to
deal with human degradation. Any attempt to solve the
problems of skid row by police roundups is doomed to fail-
ure .... Private morality is no concern of the state. Intoxi-
cation or degradation that does not disturb others does not
warrant commitment by process either criminal or civil in
nature. The penal approach to the problem of skid row is
an attempt by legislation to enforce private morality. Such
efforts have never been successful and frequently do much
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positive harm .... The penal approach to the problem of
skid row is a national disgrace."
Lawyers in other states are beginning to recognize some re-
sponsibility in the field of alcoholism. However, apathy and reti-
cence is encountered in places other than Colorado. This was ex-
pressed by Hon. Frank S. Ketcham of Washington, D. C., chairman
of the Subcommittee on Alcoholic Problems of the American Bar
Association, as follows:
"Lawyers, curiously, for the most part have shied away
from coming to grips with the most important medical-
social problem of our civilization. Alcoholism is a commu-
nity problem and one might think that lawyers, who are
community leaders, would want to assume a role. Alcohol-
ism, too, is a 'controversial' subject, and perhaps, although
the thought appalls me, attorneys are tending to stay away
from matters of controversy."
To the everlasting credit of the bar of Colorado, it may now be
said, that although we were slow to recognize the need for our
services, we are making a sincere, genuine effort to bring our state
up to date, if not into the forefront, in its approach to a vexing
public problem from the standpoint of its legal aspects. Lawyers and
judges are now offering their services to this committee, which
welcomes the suggestions and counsel of all who are interested in
meeting this new challenge to the ingenuity of the Colorado Bar.
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THE LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE OF THE
DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
By FORREST C. O'DELL
For the person of means, obtaining legal guidance is no prob-
lem, but the average salaried man or wage earner is under a handi-
cap. He probably doesn't know a lawyer and may think of lawyers
as being persons committed to the service of large corporations and
the wealthy at huge fees; or perhaps, has heard of them as unscru-
pulous, and so he foregoes seeking legal assistance when he may
badly need it.
In an effort to meet this need the Denver Bar Association
established the Lawyer Referral Service about ten years ago. Any
lawyer interested could join the panel without charge at that time.
The names of the lawyers to whom cases were referred were ro-
tated in order and when an inquiry was made at the Bar Association
office the client was given the name, address and phone number
of the next attorney on the list. The attorneys participating agreed
to abide by rules established by the Lawyer Referral Committee,
such as charging only five dollars for the first half-hour interview.
If further work was required, the fee would be established by
mutual agreement between the attorney and the client at the time
of the initial consultation. If a disagreement arose over the fee, the
matter was to be arbitrated by the Committee.
The plan grew slowly, but with the increase of population, the
demands on the service increased proportionately. The case load
became such that by the summer of 1957 the Bar Association office
was averaging eight referrals a day. This created a serious staff
problem for the Association office. The person receiving the call
had to ascertain the nature of the legal problem involved, and select
the next attorney on the list. If that attorney's card indicated he
did not care to handle the particular type of legal question con-
cerned, the next card would have to be examined and the client
referred accordingly. Frequently the nature of the matter was such
that the office would have to call the attorney immediately and
Best Wishes to the Bar Association
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advise him of the referral. A notice of the referral then had to be
prepared and mailed out to the attorney. Thirty days thereafter a
follow-up letter went to the attorney to ascertain if the client had
contacted him. If so, the nature of the services rendered, the
amount of the fee, etc., were requested in order to keep statistical
control of the service.
With all of the administrative work required by each referral,
the demands upon the time of the staff and the financial burden to
the Association became considerable. Although no accurate study
had been made, it was estimated that each referral cost the Associa-
tion about three dollars. It was suggested by Royal C. Rubright,
incoming President for 1957-58, that the Lawyer Referral Service
Committee should attempt to devise a plan which might ease the
financial burden of this activity. The Committee studied several
plans and adopted a system which became effective January 1, 1958,
requiring lawyers desirous of participating on the panel to pay an
annual fee of five dollars for those practicing five years or less, and
ten dollars per year for all others. The fund established by the fees
collected provided sufficient money to pay for a classified ad in the
telephone directory and a substantial portion of the salary of one
of the girls in the Bar Association office.
Another difficult problem was presented by the client who
failed to make an appointment with the lawyer to whom he had
been referred, or, having made the appointment, did not appear.
Numerous suggestions regarding a means of alleviating this prob-
lem were studied. Space limitations in the Association offices and
limited finances made the problem doubly difficult. It was then
decided to assign to one girl in the office the responsibility of mak-
ing all referrals. For this service, a portion of her salary was to be
paid from the fund established by the panel fees. An extra phone,
paid for by the service, was put on her desk. As inquiries were re-
ceived, she would ascertain the nature of the problem and the
geographical location of the prospective client. She would then call
a lawyer on the other phone and confirm an appointment at a
mutually convenient time. This method of handling the referrals
was inaugurated in August of 1958. When the call is received, the
girl explains that a fee of five dollars is charged by the attorney
for the first half-hour interview. If further legal services are re-
quired, the fee is a matter for mutual agreement between the
parties.
During the last three months of the operations under the old
system, 44% of the prospective clients referred did not make an
appointment or failed to keep the appointment they made.
11 Lle 1irst Lilree monbhAs of 1959, only 58 of 300 referrals faled
to keep the appointment-less than 20%, which means that we de-
creased the "no shows" considerably. This meant a considerable im-
SA[HS-LAJLOR. CORPORATIOln SEALS- ALPinE 5-3422
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provement in the Service through a decrease in "lost time" for the
lawyers on the panel and the Association staff and a minimum of
inconvenience.
The Lawyer Referral Service is perhaps the best activity the
Association sponsors for promoting good public relations in our
community. Some progress has been made on an expanded publicity
program for the Service. Negotiations are now being pursued to
publicize the Lawyer Referral Service through the media of radio,
TV and the newspapers.
For the service to be of maximum value to citizens and lawyers
in the Denver area, a wider participation by attorneys and more
financing will be needed in the immediate future. With expanded
physical facilities soon to be available to the Association in the
University of Denver Law Center, one of the handicaps to the effi-
cient operation of this Service will be alleviated. Adequate
finances, necessary for an expanded program, can be obtained by
wider participation by lawyers. The younger lawyer should know
that the average fee received per referral approximates forty dol-
lars. The older lawyer should realize that those using the plan need
his help. He should consider his obligations to the profession and
to the people in need of his help. To him it should be a matter of
honor and personal pride, rather than monetary gain.
The Lawyer Referral Service of the Denver Bar Association
constitutes a valuable public service to the community. It provides
a means to the citizens in the Denver metropolitan area whereby
they can be assured of being referred to a competent, reliable attor-
ney for legal representation. Additionally, it permits the lawyers
to obtain additional clients and consequently improve their eco-
nomic status.
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